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The bulk of the literature on intra-household allocation discusses the relation-
ship, power, and division of family resources between husband and wife. Seek-
ing a wider understanding of family, researchers have broadened their scope to
an intergenerational level, the dynamics of a parent and child are the focus of
the first two papers: the first a two-stage theoretical discussion, and the second
an empirical cross-sectional study. The third paper is a companion piece to the
second, using the fieldwork as a case study.
Paper 1 Intra-household literature focuses on bargaining power between
husbands and wives, but does not consider the process between parents and
children. The bequest literature asks how parents pass on wealth to their chil-
dren but generally ignores the possibility that later in life parents may be co-
dependent with children. Drawing on both arenas of family analysis, I present
a model representing the nature of negotiation that may happen between parent
and child: in stage one the parent is the sole decision maker, and then in stage
two the child grows to participate in the bargaining process. The education
decision the parent made in stage one affects the second period outcome; the
child has more bargaining power with higher levels of education. A simplified
analysis is done first with purely selfish participants, and then with a purely
altruistic parent in a bequest model. These two extreme models are combined
to form a model with both self-interested and altruistic components accruing to
parent and child, a more realistic scenario. The contrasting models of a purely
selfish parent with a purely altruistic parent provide insight as to how an inter-
mediate result emerges in this model, which incorporates both characteristics.
I conclude with a discussion of what would happen if a separation option is
available, interpreted as an alternative wage scheme under migration.
Paper 2 Within the literature on intra-household allocation I discuss a
new population: teenage mothers and their mothers in Salvador, Brazil. A
household survey and experimental games are the techniques used to analyze
decision-making. A trust game tests for efficiency, and another game elicits
valuations of a counting book, a newly introduced educational toy, to test for
bargaining at the population level. While the experimental good is not rep-
resentative of all elements comprising a baby’s welfare, nor do these interac-
tions purely reflect all household bargaining, this new method of analysis can
be helpful when deciding policy for welfare transfers when endogeneity com-
plicates econometric technique or when impoverished families are omitted from
standard analysis due to a lack of private goods. At the population level, I
find little evidence of bargaining, and Pareto efficient families’ willingness to
pay for the counting book is lower than the others’. The variety of behavior in
the games suggests multiple family structures, some outside the typical mod-
els, and responses to the sociological questions included in the survey indicate
complexity of household dynamics.
Paper 3 Tension has long existed between qualitative and quantitative re-
search methodologies, but there is a movement to reconcile them within devel-
opment research practices. This is an ongoing process, seeping into mainstream
development economics, but instruction of qualitative methods for economists
is not emphasized. Besides making a case for qualitative methodology, I also
offer my research in Salvador, Brazil, as a case study that highlights how qual-
itative and quantitative research can interact to inform policy. I employ both
quantitative and qualitative research to determine the family structure of teen
mothers who live with their mothers. I also use both techniques to identify
risks faced by their children. Then qualitatively I analyze the three models of
social support offered to teen mothers in Salvador: community groups, home
visits, and conditional cash transfers. Considering the children’s risks and fam-
ily structure, I conclude with suggestions of how the Brazilian government can
coordinate social efforts through the Bolsa Familia program.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As I explain my dissertation topic to new acquaintances and my parents’
friends, many are surprised that the degree is in economics. The discipline con-
jures up images of stock markets and firms, not families and children’s books.
As the only economist at the Social Science Research Council IDRF post-field
work conference, my fellow award recipients were impressed that my topic was
more aligned with their ideas of sociology than economics. (And, ironically, it
was the political scientists who were studying firms.) At times, I have wondered
if I am studying in the wrong field. In this introduction I take a step back and
discuss how my topic fits into the subject of economics, explaining the thread
of research whence it comes. Most of this explanation can be found at a more
technical level somewhere within the body of work, but this introduction is the
overarching story for non-economists and a reminder to myself that I am not in
the wrong field after all.
At a basic level, microeconomics can be divided into two foci, the consumers
and the producers. Historically, the unit of analysis is firms on the producer
side and individuals on the consumer side. Leaving aside the complications of
employees, managers, and work incentives, we face our own problems on the
consumer side of things: when consumption data is collected, it is usually at the
family level. Apartments are rented for entire families, food is not rung up at
the checkout counter on a per-child tab, and soccer balls and ping-pong tables
are used by all family members, not to mention the neighborhood friends. This
leaves econometrics in a predicament: theory is based on individual choices but
the data is a result of family dynamics.
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While economists always recognized that families are made up of individ-
uals, innovations in game theory allowed clever modelers to apply them to
the household. Models of household decision-making came to explain how a
family’s purchases reflect the non-aligning preferences of husband and wife.
’Whose preference gets more weight and why?’ is key to these discussions. The
simplest case is only one person making all the decisions in the household or
that the household is in such harmony that no matter who makes the decision
the outcome would be the same. Some speculate that the spouses make their
own decisions in different realms of household life. For example, the wife de-
cides on the espresso machine and furniture while the husband gets to pick the
make of the car. Other models suggest that negotiation happens in all spheres,
with bargaining power determined by a variety of factors: education level, per-
cent of income brought to the family, social status, age, etc.
Laws can affect bargaining power as well. For example, physical strength
should no longer influence the family’s decision if domestic violence is severely
punished. Likewise a woman may have more power in bargaining if she will
be awarded much alimony in the case of divorce. These latter considerations
suggest that certain factors improve not only women’s bargaining power but
also welfare. A natural transition to development economics emerges when we
consider the welfare of those in developing countries. Women’s issues are of
special importance as many women are treated relatively worse in these coun-
tries than in western ones. Children’s welfare has also come into the discussion.
Education and nutrition have improved for children when women are targeted
with cash transfers, one of the factors that likely affects bargaining power. Since
education and nutrition are key elements of poverty alleviation, this has further
cemented the topic within economic development circles.
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Yet family composition is not always mother and father and children, espe-
cially in developing countries. Frequently grandparents are present, or an older
child does not move out right after college. Whether due to the cultural context
or economic necessity, these larger families with a different set of actors as de-
cision makers mean that western theory must be modified to take these varied
relationships into account.
My first paper, ”Selfish, Selfless, or Both: Intergenerational Education De-
cisions Bargained Under Competing Models,” presents some key points of the
relationship between parents and children and illustrates how these can be in-
corporated into a two-stage model. First, when the child is very young, he has
no power at all, but will grow into having bargaining power when he is older.
The degree to which he acquires power will be based on his educational at-
tainment, a factor that will allow him to earn money and influence the family.
The parent must decide how to prepare for the future: save in a bank or in-
vest in his child’s education. A selfish parent may foresee that he shall loose
his influence and limit his child’s educational attainment; he sacrifices a loss in
total family income in favor of his own consumption, which would be at risk
should the child attain much wealth. A selfless parent is not concerned for his
own consumption, but educates and invests in such a way that the child will
have maximum income in the future. Most parents, however, are neither selfish
nor selfless; a combination of these two simple models brings more complexity.
These key points are aspects of a basic model that can be used as a building
block for further developments in theory.
”Intergenerational Intra-Household Allocation: Teen Mothers and Their
Mothers in Salvador, Brazil” studies the interactions of this specific popula-
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tion of parents and children. This is an important population for the field of
intra-household allocation; not only is do we have the parent-child dynamic,
but there is a third party, the teen’s child, whose welfare is affected by their
decisions. The data was collected in Salvador, Brazil, from teens who lived
with their mothers and participated in the NGO Pastoral da Crianc¸a. Ques-
tions about decision-making were included on survey, with a focus on care for
the teen’s child. The responses suggest that, in a typical family, while the teen is
designated to be principally responsible for her child, her mother makes over-
arching decisions for the entire household. The family also participated in two
experimental games. For one of them I designed and produced a counting book
over which the two bargained about how much they would be willing to pay
to purchasing it. Comparing the mother’s individual valuation for the product
to the grandmother’s may indicate relative preference for the child’s toy and a
joint valuation illustrates the bargained result. I find little evidence of bargain-
ing when analyzing the results of this game. The other game gives players a
sum and asks participants to contribute to a hat, which has the ’magic power’
of doubling all money inside. The participants each own the hat once, and the
test of trust is if an individual contributes to the hat when the other person is
the owner. In about a third of the families results are inconclusive, as the set-up
proved difficult for some to understand. In about a third of the families both
teen and her mother contributed all their wealth to the other person. In the
final third, where some wealth was withheld, it was a small amount, suggest-
ing that these families still share a significant amount of trust. ”The Interaction
between Quantitative and Qualitative Research in Development Economics: A
Case Study” is tightly linked to the second paper, explaining the qualitative
methodology used in data collection, as well as offering a few anthropological
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style observations. It does include further insights into the relationships be-
tween teen mothers and their mothers, as well as the Brazilian context in which
these families are located. This is not the focal point, however, so this work is
less directly about parents and children than the other papers in the thesis; it
includes much commentary on the state of qualitative research in development
economics today and how to incorporate it into quantitative fieldwork.
This thesis is also connected by a thread of feminist thought. Family eco-
nomics has grown in part due to feminist concerns, with critiques of harmo-
nious families or masculine decision makers pushing for advances in models
with active women. Without these advances, the natural transition from con-
sidering interaction between husband-wife to that of parent-child would not
have arisen. Clearly, my fieldwork takes a feminist focus, with the population
in question composed entirely of women. The final paper echoes a feminist
critique of economics, a field which emphasizes ’hard’ quantitative research to
’soft’ qualitative studies. It is my hope that this dissertation is a contribution to
the feminist agenda through meticulous scholarship, illustrating the importance
of these topics in their own right.
On a more humorous note, now that I am married, sometimes people ask if
my husband and I are going to start a family and I tell them my dissertation is
my first child. The experiences told here are my relationship with my offspring!
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CHAPTER 2
SELFISH, SELFLESS, OR BOTH? INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATION
DECISIONS BARGAINED UNDER COMPETING MODELS
2.1 Introduction
The literature on household economics historically bases theory on nuclear fam-
ilies. Though this strategy helps keep models simple, in reality more complex
household structures prevail. The while countries like Italy offer examples of
families staying together for cultural reasons, in developing countries the moti-
vation leans toward economic rather than cultural (although these days it may
be also the case in Italy). Sometimes families share dwellings with relatives to
reduce costs. Frequently children live with their parents until married, or a fam-
ily may welcome elderly grandparents who are unable to sustain themselves as
pensions are uncertain or minuscule. A cousin from the interior lives with an
aunt in order to attend the university in the city. Even in the United States fam-
ily structure is evolving. I remember telling my friends abroad that Americans
were very independent: when a child leaves for college she never goes back to
live with parents. Returning to live in the US three years later I was taken aback
that this is also a changing trend: several of my friends and my sister’s friends
had moved home with their parents after graduation.
A complex family structure implies that standard bargaining models are in-
sufficient for a comprehensive analysis of a family’s allocative decisions, yet the
bulk of intrahousehold bargaining literature only consider husband and wife.
While this has been helpful to establish a framework for initial study, further
theoretical advances are necessary. A more realistic model would allow for the
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plurality of actors as well as the different relationships between them. While
economics does offer tools to consider multiple actors in bargaining situations,
and, as mentioned before, has analyzed in depth the relationship between hus-
bands and wives, what is lacking in the literature is a model of bargaining be-
tween parents and children. The unique character of this relationship suggests
that a simple application of existing bargaining models would be wanting be-
cause the child’s transition from dependent to economic actor is one that the
parent influences. Through a child’s upbringing, the parent fosters abilities that
affect the child’s earning power and bargaining skills. When a child is young,
the parent can be aware how parenting choices can affect the outcome of a fu-
ture bargaining situation. In this paper I will focus on developing this aspect
of theory. While also an over-simplification of reality, it is one that has not yet
been considered. We will be one step closer to a comprehensive model of the
family that synthesizes multiple actors and their complex relationships once the
simplified parent-child relationship has been explored.
This paper begins with a literature review that traces the trajectory of eco-
nomic intrahousehold analysis mentioned above. Also reviewed is the bequest
literature, where the parent-child relationship has been analyzed before, though
the child is not an economic actor. This literature asks how parents pass on
wealth to their children but assumes that parents are self sufficient until they die
and will not be co-dependent with children. Drawing on elements of both are-
nas of family analysis, in part three I present a simplified model of selfish actors
with two stages: each stage represents a different relationship between parent
and child. In stage one the parent is the sole actor and makes decisions for him-
self and the child regarding consumption, savings, and education. Stage two
is a bargaining game after the child is grown and the parent no longer works;
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the child is now an actor negotiating with the parent on how to determine con-
sumption. Education and savings decisions from the previous period affect the
outcome of this second period, including whether the child decides to migrate.
Section four presents a comparable bequest model with a selfless parent to offer
results that contrast to those of the selfish parent. Section five combines these
two models into one where the parent and child have complex personalities of
both selfish and generous components. Having previously examined the sim-
pler models illustrates how the model’s forces counteract each other. Section six
concludes with a discussion of threat points and how a migration option may
influence the results.
2.2 Literature Review
In the initial stages of family economics, intra-family decision making was dis-
missed. Samuelson’s 1951 paper on social indifference curves is one of the first
formal economic discussions of differing preferences within the family. Proving
the impossibility of social indifference curves, he is conflicted with his under-
standing of family as a social unit, but he reconciles: “if within the family there
can be assumed to take place an optimal reallocation of income so as to keep
each member’s dollar expenditure of equal ethical worth, then there can be de-
rived for the whole family a set of well-behaved indifference contours relating
the totals of what it consumes: the family can be said to act as if it maximizes
such a group preference function.” Gary Becker’s seminal Treatise on the Family
(1981) maintains this principle, characterizing the family as run by an altruistic
dictator. Almost every intrahousehold bargaining article begins by citing him,
usually to disagree. Without his controversial statements, the field might not
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have grown so much.
The feminist reaction has focused on the bargaining power of wives: “While
Becker broke ground by considering marriage to be ‘economic’ in a choice theo-
retic sense, the economics of marriage in a provisioning sense has always been a
topic that few women can ignore. Marriage has often been a woman’s bread and
butter” (Nelson, 1994 pg 127). Bargaining models are believed to be more realis-
tic than a single household head making all consumption decisions; they main-
tain individuality as well as allow for communication and altruism. Amartya
Sen’s work on cooperative conflicts helps establish that family relationships are
not always harmonious, but neither are they full of cut-throat competition that
economists often use to characterize agents (1989). A middle ground can also
be theoretically sustainable: a family functions on its possibilities frontier, but
the exact location on the frontier is up for negotiation.
At this point most research has rejected Becker’s unitary model as naive.
Unlikely the household in complete harmony, or a pure dictator suppressing
the preferences of the other members. Instead economists ask if households
are efficient. Carter and Katz (1997) suggest that inefficiency may arise out of
cultural norms, where men do men’s work and women do women’s work. Udry
empirically explores the supply and determines that household allocation of
labor in Burkina Faso is not Pareto optimal. Land plots controlled by women
yield significantly less than those of their husbands: there is empirical evidence
for non-cooperative outcomes (1996).
Another popular model is the cooperative Nash Bargaining; this model pre-
dicts a Pareto optimal outcome for the household. The main framework for
the model comes from Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
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(1981). They show that demand for goods derived from this model, even though
achieved cooperatively and Pareto efficiently, do not necessarily fit the neo-
classical demand assumptions. This theoretical support allowed economists to
break away from the concept of the family acting as a single consumer. Lund-
berg and Pollak further modified the Nash model to consider the threat points
to not be divorce, but a breakdown of cooperation; without cooperation equilib-
rium reverts to the Carter and Katz outcome characterized by traditional roles
and separate spheres for husband and wife (1993).
The collective model also predicts a Pareto optimal household, but does not
consider threat points (Chiappori, 1992, Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992, and
Browning, et. al. 1994). The collective model maximizes a weighted average of
the participants’ utility, with the weight being the sharing rule representing bar-
gaining power. With empirical simplicity, all that is needed to determine into
which bargaining regime the family fits is an assignable good and changes in ex-
ogenous income. For example, how does spending on womans clothing change
when the wife wins the lottery as opposed to when the husband does. No dif-
ference indicates a unitary model: both share the same preferences or the family
has a dictator. Using this technique, Thomas rejects the unitary model in Brazil
when considering childrens nutrition (1994). Adam et. al. also reject the unitary
model in Canada, as does Attanasio (2002) in rural Mexico. Over and over the
unitary model has been rejected such that Alderman et. al. suggest that this be
reflected better in policy: transfers can be targeted to the appropriate household
member (1995). In other words, policy makers should have a bargaining game
as their fundamental understanding of marriage rather than the unitary model.
Only a few authors have taken the bargaining games to an inter-temporal
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level. Kaushik Basu suggests that non Pareto optimal sub-game perfect equi-
libria can exist in the dynamic Nash Bargaining case (2006). Ethan Ligon also
rejects Pareto optimality in unions with equilibria renegotiated over time (2002).
Empirical studies of the dynamic models have not yet come forth en masse,
but Lancaster, Maitra and Ray find support of this endogeneity in India (2006).
Hans Haller achieves a similar non-Pareto optimal result (for the economy as
a whole) without the inter-temporal aspect by allowing for externalities among
household members which cannot be completely internalized (2000).
Though intrahousehold bargaining is not limited to interactions between
husbands and wives (–even Samuelson recognized that his children were mak-
ing decisions about chocolate and peppermint–), this has been the main focus
of the literature (1956). Children in the first world have a smaller economic role
relative to their parents than in the developing world, which may be another
reason these interactions have not yet been highlighted. “There is a significant
cross-cultural and historical variation in the degree to which young children
contribute to household income. In some societies they begin to work in the
household at the age of 7 or 8, with little or no interruption for education. In oth-
ers school attendance may begin at the age of 5 or 6 and absorb most of the chil-
dren’s time until well into adulthood” (Folbre, 1984 pg 307). Carolyn Moehling
offers historical evidence of working children engaging in a bargaining relation-
ship with their parents (2005). Though they often had to turn the money over
to their parents, they could determine how a portion of it was spent. A cost
of living survey in the early 20th century indicates that families with working
daughters have a higher expenditure on daughter’s clothing per dollar earned
than others. Vegard Iversen finds that some teenage boys in India are making
their own decisions regarding migration and work independent of their par-
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ents (2002). Reynolds (in progress) finds evidence of bargaining between teen
mothers who live with their mothers in Brazil, yet only in some aspects of baby
care (2010). Yet even when children are in school, Jim Berry finds evidence of
bargaining between between parents and children over studying habits. With
incentives for improved test results, outcomes differ when the incentives are di-
rected toward parents from when the incentives are directed toward children
(working paper). The trajectory of the intrahousehold literature is leading us to
consider relationships as well. These recent empirical findings suggest that in-
tergenerational bargaining is an important issue and a more defined theoretical
framework could be helpful.
Yet models are never close enough to reality to avoid critiques. Bina
Agarawal identifies some problematic issues for rural women: ownership and
control of assets, access to employment and communal resources, support from
NGOs and the State, and perceptions, norms, and access to traditional social
support systems (1997). Furthermore there may be a meta-bargaining game
taking place, with society itself bargaining over social norms, laws, and inter-
pretation of these. Fortunately the critiques help push the field forward, and
one successful response to this later challenges is Kaushik Basu’s work “Gender
and Say”, which illustrates a repeated bargaining game may allow for a hus-
band to strategically limit outcomes so a wife does not gain too much power in
the future (2006). This paper takes a similar approach looking at how a parent
may influence future outcomes between self and child. The difference is that
the child always starts with no power and transitions naturally to having some
power. In the marriage model the wife often starts with some power, and if she
starts with no power, there is little hope for gaining more with out intervention.
Not so for the child; as education is inherently valued by the parent, bargain-
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ing power increases automatically. The meta-bargaining issue has come to the
intergenerational level.
In contrast to the intra-household literature focusing on a horizontal rela-
tionship between husband and wife, the bequest literature takes a vertical per-
spective to the relationship between parent and child. The parent makes the
decisions for the child’s future with concern for the child attaining maximum
wealth. Usually the child does not take part in the decision to be educated or
how much his parent will save for his inheritance. As the bequest literature
has grown more complex, there are now competing models of parental decision
making in this regard. Preferences now come to the forefront: do parents care
about equality in wealth, bequests, or expected lifetime earnings of their chil-
dren? A series of papers explore these nuances (Behrman, et. al., 1995). The
wealth model indicates that the total wealth of the child is what matters to the
parent; a parent invests in the child’s education until marginal returns equal the
returns to savings. The separable earnings-transfers model implies that child’s
income and bequests enter separately into the parent’s utility function; there is
more scope for parents preference for equality among children. Since I am tak-
ing a simplified approach with only one child, the separable earnings-transfers
model is not applicable, so we shall leave this discussion for future works.
The child has a small bit of autonomy in what is perhaps the most famous
parent-child economic interaction, the Rotten-Kid Theorem, another brainchild
of the father of family economics, Gary Becker. Becker’s model indicates that
selfish offspring will always act to maximize household income in order to max-
imize a later bequest by the parent, who holds the household purse strings.
Thus the child’s agency is of no concern for the parent. However, Theodore
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Bergstrom refines the to say that this only happens under a certain set of utility
functions; incentive problems are not always solved simply by the presence of
a benevolent household head (1989). In my model I allow for both child agency
and the parent’s choice of considering future child consumption.
2.3 A Bargaining Model of Parental Selfishness
My theoretical model draws from these two literatures of intra-household bar-
gaining and the bequests, using education as an example of a factor that influ-
ences the child’s bargaining power, but also one which the parent chooses for
the child and will influence future income. In the initial set-up, the goal of the
parent is not to pass along wealth to the child, but to maximize his own con-
sumption. However, in period 2 the parent will be partially dependent on the
child for income so by increasing the child’s education, he may be increasing
his own welfare as well as that of the child’s; on the other hand, by giving his
child more power, parental consumption may be reduced. Though our inner
psyches writhe against the selfish parent, other economists have likewise toyed
with similarly sinister thoughts. Dasgupta illustrates a possible conflict of inter-
est between parents and children when a government shifts transfers from one
parent to the other (Dasgupta, 2009). To avoid complete unorthodox assump-
tions, a component of generosity will be integrated later, but since the altruism
complicates effects and makes results more ambiguous, the final analysis shall
be done also with a numerical example. For the time being we shall stick to our
variables in this less accurate, though darkly elegant, analysis as we establish
the framework for the more complex application.
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The model is a simplification of the family into a mere parent-child relation-
ship. Though unrealistic, such mental experiments on this theme have been
undertaken before and likewise draw lessons to promote contemplation. Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein morally questions the endowments given to offspring.
Victor Frankenstein takes on the power of creation to build a man of unequaled
physical perfection. Of course, his creation gets out of hand and results in a
monster. When the two have a disagreement in preferences (the monster wants
a wife and Victor does not want to make him one), Victor’s choices in making
the monster come back to influence the outcome of this “bargaining” process.
We can only imagine that Victor would have rather preferred to endow his crea-
ture with less physical capabilities had he been able to foresee the course of
events; this foresight effect is precisely what this model describes.
Since this model is solved using backward induction, I begin by describing
the outcome of period two, the bargaining period. I use a collective model,
which is commonly used in the intrahousehold literature. With this outcome I
return to period one, where the parent is making consumption, education, and
savings choices which influence utility in both periods; the decisions taken in
period one are those which maximize the parent’s lifetime utility.
If utility were maximized without taking the bargaining in the second period
into account, the model would be like that of the wealth model in the bequest
literature and Frankenstein. If the second period bargaining model were solved
without taking the parental influence from the first period into account, it is
similar to the existing intrahousehold literature. One surprising result of includ-
ing both perspectives will be the foresight effect, that under certain conditions,
the parent’s sense of foreboding that the child could gain too much power will
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dampen the size of educational training that the parent bestows on the child
relative to the other models.
2.3.1 Development of the second stage
To begin I analyze the second period, as is standard for two period games, when
the child is grown and participating in the family’s economic decision process.
Assume a cooperative bargaining framework for allocation between a par-
ent (individual 1) and a child (individual 2). For simplicity we shall assume that
there are no public goods, and each finds utility in his own consumption of pri-
vate goods x1 and x2. The utility functions are the same: U′ > 0, U′(0) = ∞, and
U′′ < 0. Consumption, however is individual; the parent and the child only care
about their unique consumable. The two engage in a cooperative bargaining
exercise bound by the budget constraint of household income Y . The strength
of the child’s bargaining power is represented by θ, where θ ∈ [0, 1]. Likewise
the parent’s bargaining strength is 1 − θ. Prices are assumed equal to one. In
period two (the period analyzed here) Y and θ are given. However decisions in
period one can affect Y and θ and thus will be influencing the outcome here.
max
x1,x2
(1 − θ)U(x1) + θU(x2) (2.1)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ Y
FOC : θU′(Y − x1) = (1 − θ)U′(x1) (2.2)
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The solution, x∗1 = x1(θ, Y) and x
∗
2 = x1(θ, Y). Note that when θ = 1, we have
the corner solution that all income is spent on x2. Likewise if θ = 0, all is spent
on x1. Furthermore, using the implicit function theorem on the FOC’s, we can
determine that the parent’s second period consumption x∗1 is increasing in Y,
and decreasing in θ.
dx∗1
dY
=
θU′′(Y − x∗1)
(1 − θ)U′′(x∗1) + θU′′(Y − x∗1)
> 0 (2.3)
dx∗1
dθ
=
U′(x∗1) + U
′(Y − x∗1)
(1 − θ)U′′(x∗1) + θU′′(Y − x∗1)
< 0 (2.4)
2.3.2 Parental Influence
Now let us assume that income Y in this second period has two components.
One portion comes from the parent’s prior savings s which has grown propor-
tionately to the interest rate r. The other portion of family income is earned
by the child: w(e) is a return to educational attainment e. w′ > 0 and w′′ < 0.
Y(e, s, r) = s(1 + r) + w(e).
Furthermore, we shall also assume that the more education the child has,
the more bargaining power he will have. θ is now a function of e. This will be
partially due to confidence and self esteem that comes from higher earning ca-
pabilities and also to increased sense of superiority through academic snobbery.
In some sense it captures the idea of a threat point contributing to bargaining
power: the more educated the child, the easier for him to leave home to under-
take life on his own.
Yet θ will also be influenced by how much income the parent has at present.
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If the parent saved a lot or the interest rate is very high, he will have more
power instead of the child. Thus θ = θ(e, s, r). If s = 0, we assume the parent
has no power: θ(e, 0, r) = 1. dθds < 0 and
dθ
dr < 0. Also assume
dθ
de > 0 and
d2θ
de2 < 0;
θ(0, s, r) = 0 and θ(∞, s, r) = 1. I allow for the concavity of θ in e since the parent
has some innate power just from being a parent; a first loss of power is more
easily relinquished than the last.
Even when the child is small, the parent foresees the future relationship be-
tween himself and his own child. (Perhaps the parent understands only too
well, having been a child once himself.) He is in a conundrum. Should he
choose to educate the child more, the parent can consume more since total fam-
ily income rises. On the other hand, the child may get too big for his britches and
take over the bargaining power in the household. If this were an isolated deci-
sion with savings given, without another period to consider, the parent solves
this problem by maximizing U(x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r))) with respect to e. Since
U′ > 0, we can do the same by maximizing x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r)) with respect
to e. (This is not necessarily concave, however, so should multiple solutions
arise, they must be checked to determine the global max.)
Using the FOC from the bargaining problem, more use of the implicit func-
tion theorem may help us determine the shape of x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r))), when s
and r are given.
The implicit function theorem gives us
dx∗1
de
=
dθ
deU
′(s(1 + r) + w(e) − x∗1) + w′(e)θ(e, s, r)U′′(s(1 + r) + w(e) − x∗1) + dθdeU′(x∗1)
(1 − θ(e, s, r))U′′(x∗1) + θ(e, s, r)U′′(s(1 + r) + w(e) − x∗1)
(2.5)
To determine the shape it would be nice to examine the endpoints to simplify
the function where θ=0 or e = 0. Unfortunately this does not work without
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Figure 2.1: The shape of x∗1(e), parental consumption in period two, is con-
cave due to the concavity of the wage function and is decreas-
ing at larger values of e due to θ, the coefficient of power in the
family. The more education the child has, the more income the
family has, but a smaller portion goes to the parent.
knowing further derivatives since at the limit we have conflicting forces: take
the last term dθde = U
′(x∗1). As e → ∞, dθde goes to zero. Yet because the parent has
no power, x∗1 → 0, and U′(x∗1) → ∞. To determine which term ‘wins,’ we would
need more information about the functional forms.
Let us instead examine a simple numerical example. Let θ = ee+(1+r)s , con-
cave and increasing, meaning that (1+r)se+(1+r)s is convex and decreasing. Let w be
zLn(e+1). z is a factor that scales the returns to education. Figure 2.1 shows x1(e)
holding s constant at 50 and varying r and z. Other specifications of w and θ
bring about similar shapes, although for a sufficiently small s or a large enough
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base wage when e = 0 eliminated the hump; x∗1(e) was only decreasing in e. In-
tuitively, as education increases the child is gaining in earnings for the family,
but the parent is also losing power. Furthermore, because earnings are concave
in education, at some point the power the parent is losing is no longer offset by
the gains in consumption.
2.3.3 Two Periods
The educational choice, however, is not actually so simple. Let us now consider
the first period, when the parent must choose between private consumption xo,
personal savings s, as well as the amount of education e for the child. Further-
more there is a minimum amount c which must be spent on food for the child.
Less than this and the child will die; the parent will be put in jail and have zero
utility now and forever. Expenditure beyond c will improve the child’s welfare
and future wages; a healthier child makes for a more productive adult. To keep
the model simple, though, we shall assume additional spending beyond c to
be lumped into the variable e, since the effect in the second period is the same.
Again for simplicity, we shall assume no benefit of education in the first period,
it only accrues in the second period, which is the bargaining problem described
above.
Limited by his period 1 income y, the parent will choose education e at price
p, savings s, and first period consumption xo to maximize lifetime utility, the
sum of his utility from both periods.
max
xo,e,s
U(xo) + U(x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r))) (2.6)
s.t.xo + pe + c + s ≤ y
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To simplify notation since c is a constant, the income can be normalized to
yo = y − c. It is also easy to see that xo = yo − s − pe which can be substituted into
the objective function and now we can maximize over e and s.
The FOCs:
pU′(yo − s − pe) = U′(x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r)))
dx∗1
de
(2.7)
U′(yo − s − pe) = U′(x∗1(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r)))
dx∗1
ds
(2.8)
The budget constraint holds with equality.
Claim 1: e∗ is less than the e that solves w′(e) = p(1 + r)
Proof: In order for the system of equations to have a solution,
dx∗1
ds
=
dx∗1
de
p
(2.9)
Expanding, we get
(1 − θ(e, s, r))[p(1 + r) − w′(e∗)] = Y(e, s, r)(pdθ
ds
− dθ
de
) (2.10)
Since the right side is negative, thus must be the left side, implying p(1 +
r) − w′(e∗) < 0. If the function w is such that w′(e) is never greater than p(1 + r),
then there is no expenditure on education at all. This is not a surprise, since
this condition is where the marginal family gain of savings equals the marginal
family gain of education. Yet the parent only gains if the trade-off from giving
up consumption by reducing savings is compensated by increased consumption
from education. This increase is tempered by the loss of bargaining power, so
the parent has no incentive to invest if returns to education are so low. This case
is uninteresting, though, so from now on we shall assume that the expression
p(1 + r) − w′(e∗) < 0 holds for at least some e.
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Figure 2.2: The Selfish Model: graphs of the parent’s lifelong utility fron-
tier under the selfish model with p=1 and income=100 with re-
turns to education and returns to savings varied. w = zLn(e + 1)
and θ = ee+(1+r)s . The left axes is savings and the right axes
is education with the vertical axes utility. A negative interest
rate is included in the chart to illustrate the strong effect of the
power variable. Though we would suspect a parent would in-
vest more in education since it allows for better returns, the
loss in parental power due to loss in savings actually pushes
the education choice lower. Less surprising, a higher return to
savings also decreases the optimal level of education choice,
while an increase in the returns to education increases the op-
timal level of education choice.
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Claim 2: If w′(e∗) > p(1 + r), then s∗ > 0, x∗o > 0.
Proof: We know that when s = 0, θ = 1 and therefore x1 = 0; the parent has
no power, thus no consumption, in period two. Since the parent could have an
infinite increase in utility from consuming a little instead of nothing, we know
there is not a corner solution where s = 0. For the same reasoning, x∗o must be
positive. Could there be a solution where e = 0? This depends on the functional
form of x∗1(e). As in all economic analysis, the solution is characterized by the
condition that the marginal returns in period two consumption that accrue to
the last dollar spent on education equal the returns of the last dollar saved.
dx∗1
ds
=
dx∗1
de
p
(2.11)
It is easy to see that dx
∗
1
ds > 0 since
dx∗1
ds =
dx∗1
dY
dY
ds +
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
ds . In the first term, both
are positive, and in the second, both are negative, making dx
∗
1
de positive. As we
learned earlier, the form of dx
∗
1
de is not determinable from the generic equations,
but the numeric example presented in Figure 2.1 shows that at zero dx
∗
1
de is posi-
tive, so a solution of e=0 is plausible.
2.4 A Bequest Model of Selflessness
Before incorporating generosity into our model, for symmetry let the selfless-
ness model stand alone. In this case there is no bargaining in the second period
because the parent is absent from the picture - either dead or so generous that
the child can do whatever she wishes and no bargaining takes place. On the
other side of the dichotomy from Gothic Frankenstein, our model of perfect
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selfishness, is Daddy Warbucks from Little Orphan Annie, a model of generos-
ity which we shall examine before complicating both to one of mixed selfish-
ness and selflessness. (We have some clear intuition from the selfish model, and
though summarizing the bequest model is not a contribution to the literature
persay, we examen it in contrasting light in order to gain insight on how the
generous factor will take affect when we incorporate it with selfishness in the
mixed model.) After developing mutual affection, Annie agrees to be adopted.
In the bequest literature, the child is not usually assumed a decision maker, and
here I am stretching the analogy since Annie was rather spunky. However, it
is safe to assume she had to study according to Daddy Warbucks’ wishes. In
this model, the parent is very well off or dies without ever having to be co-
dependent with the child; both are the likely case of Daddy Warbucks since
he is both extremely wealthy and quite old when he adopts Annie. Yet while
alive, Annie is his complete source of happiness, and it is easy to imagine that
he wants her to be happy after she dies, too; estate planning would be such that
the child will have the largest wealth possible, a combination of her earnings
and inheritance.
In the first period the parent maximizes his utility function which no longer
consists of his own consumption, only the child’s welfare represented by e (re-
member we had allowed this to absorb excess health and nutrition compo-
nents above c). Since the parent is no longer alive in period two (or alive but
still completely unselfish, only concerned with the child consuming as much
as possible), bequest b(e, s, r) would consist of the entire period two income,
s(1+ r)+w(e) = Y(e, s, r). Since there is no second period bargaining exercise, b is
not a function of θ. For simplicity of comparison, we shall assume that the par-
ent’s utility U(b) is the same form as U(x1) in my model; the budget constraint
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is also the same.
max
e,s
U(e) + U(b(Y(e, s, r))) (2.12)
s.t.pe + s ≤ yo
The solution will be e˜.
The FOCs:
U′(e˜) = [p(1 + r) − w′(e˜)]U′((y − pe˜)(1 + r) + w(e˜)) (2.13)
These give
1 + r =
1
p
[w′(e˜) +
U′(e˜)
U′((yo − pe˜)(1 + r) + w(e˜)) ] (2.14)
This equation parallels Becker’s wealth model where returns to education
w′(e)/p equal returns to savings (1 + r), though here we have an extra term due
to the intrinsic value the parent has placed on education. Furthermore, this
equation has exactly the same interpretation as equation 2.9 , and from this we
can determine that the education level provided to a child is lower when there is
a selfish parent and a bargained second stage than under the generous bequest
scenario.
Theorem: e∗ < e˜.
Proof: Equation 2.11 can be rewritten as
dx∗1
dY
dY
ds
+
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
ds
=
dx∗1
dY
dY
de +
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
de
p
(2.15)
Since dYds = 1 + r using 2.14 we can substitute into 2.15. Also note
dY
de = w
′(e∗).
dx∗1
dY
1
p
[w′(e˜) +
U′(e˜)
U′((y − pe˜)(1 + r) + w(e˜))] +
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
ds
=
dx∗1
dY w
′(e∗) + dx
∗
1
dθ
dθ
de
p
(2.16)
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Figure 2.3: The Selfless Model. Graphs of the parental utility frontier us-
ing the same functional forms as the Selfish Model. With the
parent uninterested in consumption for self, only education is
needed to calculate utility; savings is y-e. With the extra em-
phasis on education and no concern for a power struggle nor
parental consumption, optimal education levels much higher.
When returns to education do better than the interest rate, the
entire budget is devoted to education.
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This simplifies to
U′(e˜)
U′((y − pe˜)(1 + r) + w(e˜))
dx∗1
dY
+ p
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
ds
− dx
∗
1
dθ
dθ
de
=
dx∗1
dY
[w′(e∗) − w′(e˜)] (2.17)
With the left side positive, and dx
∗
1
dY > 0 this implies that w
′(e∗) > w′(e˜). Since
w′′ < 0, we conclude that
e∗ < eˆ (2.18)
This result implies that education levels when a parent is expecting a bar-
gaining exercise are lower than when a parent is perfectly altruistic; Daddy
Warbucks would have been less generous had he been expecting to live longer.
The altruistic parent maximizes consumption for his child, but the selfish parent
maximizes consumption for himself, and has to limit education to reign in his
child’s bargaining power.
2.5 The Mixed Model: Selfishness and Selflessness
Finally we bring both selfishness and selflessness together into one model, al-
lowing both parent and child to take on elements of each. While such a family
is not a generalization of most families, it does compare to some. The Gilmore
Girls, a popular television series, illustrates this type of relationship well. Lore-
lai had her daughter Rory when she was only 16 years old and raised her alone.
Though Lorelai clearly wants the best for her daughter, sometimes the small
age gap makes it seem that Rory is more mature than her mother. This family
is a perfect example of a parent and child who live together and are amiable
to each other, finding utility from the other’s consumption as well as her own
consumption.
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To incorporate both aspects in the model we create a new function, a meta-
utility function, which takes on these two components: the individual’s utility
as well as the utility of the other. The altruistic parameter we shall name α. If
α ∈ [0, 1), the individual cares more about himself than the other. If α > 1, the
individual cares more about the other than himself. If α < 0 he is antagonistic
toward the other, but we shall not be so cynical in our view of the family, and
rule out that case; for our purposes we shall require α to be positive. Person i’s
meta-utility function now becomes Mi(xi, x j) = U(xi) + αiU(x j). I am declaring
meta-utility for notational convenience, not for philosophical reasons. Since we
already delineated utility as U and used it in the prior two examples, to maintain
the comparability of our results I do not want to introduce another term (x j) as
an argument of U(x). Including αiU(x j) in the maximizer’s objective function
serves the same mathematical purpose and allows for parallels in our analyses
which help us better understand the results.
This analysis will follow the same structure used to discuss the selfish model,
but now with the altruistic component. We start with the second period, weight-
ing the meta-utility functions by θ. After grouping terms, the cooperative bar-
gaining problem becomes
max
x1,x2
(1 − θ + θα2)U(x1) + (α1 + θ − θα1)U(x2) (2.19)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ Y
To distinguish the results of this model from the others, this solution will
have “hats:” xˆi(θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r), α1, α2). The parent’s period two consumption is
now also decreasing in α1 and increasing in α2, as the implicit function theorem
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gives us from the FOCs:
ˆdx1
dα1
=
(1 − θ)U′(Y − xˆ1)
(1 − θ + θα2)U′′(xˆ1) + (α1 + θ − θα1)U′′(Y − xˆ1) < 0 (2.20)
dxˆ1
dα2
=
−(θ)U′(xˆ1)
(1 − θ + θα2)U′′(xˆ1) + (α1 + θ − θα1)U′′(Y − xˆ1) > 0 (2.21)
Our specifications regarding the second period Y and θ remain the same as
the selfish model. And dxˆ1dY and
dxˆ1
dθ have the same signs as
x∗1
dY and
x∗1
dθ . Yet altruism
that the parent has for the child as well as what he expects from the child, α2,
have an ameliorating effect. Also note that as in the selfish model, dxˆ1ds > 0 since
dxˆ1
ds =
dxˆ1
dY
dY
ds +
dxˆ1
dθ
dY
ds
Let us now introduce the first period choice into the model. Limited by his
period 1 income y, the parent will choose education e at price p, savings s, and
first period consumption xo to maximize lifetime utility, the sum of his utility
from both periods. Recall that we are also including e as an altruistic element in
the first period.
max
e,s,xo
U(xo) + α1U(e) + U(xˆ1[θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r), α1, α2]) + α1U(Y(e, s, r)− (2.22)
xˆ1[θ(e, s, r),Y(e, s, r), α1, α2]) s.t.xo + pe + c + s ≤ y
Note that the objective function is the selfish maximization problem (2.6) and
α1 multiplied by the altruistic maximization problem (2.12). The only detail that
keeps this from being an exact parallel is that x2 is dependent on θ, α1U(x2); in
the bequest model no power struggle is taking place. So can we conclude that
this eˆ will fall between e∗ and e˜? This is what we shall next discuss.
The FOCs give a characteristic equation1
1Y and θ are implicit functions of e,s, and r. They have been left implicit due to space.
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α1U′(e) + U′(xˆ1(θ, Y, α1, α2))
dxˆ1
de
+ α1U′(Y − xˆ1(θ, Y, α1, α2)(w′(e) − dxˆ1de ) (2.23)
= p[U′(xˆ1(θ, Y, α1, α2)) dxˆ1ds + α1U
′(Y − xˆ1(θ, Y, α1, α2)(1 + r − dxˆ1ds )]
These likewise give us a characteristic equation by which the last dollar
spent on education gives the same benefit as the last dollar saved. However,
due to our complex model, this benefit accrues in many different ways. The
parent gains benefit from education by spending in on education in the first
period, which increases personal consumption for both in the second period,
another source of utility, yet the increase in child’s consumption in period two
is also a limiting factor of his own consumption, so the total marginal utility is
tempered in that regard. The same is true for savings, though the parent has
no intrinsic delight from savings; it is only the income from savings in period
two that allow him utility. Unlike the selfish model, the educational choice can
never be zero, due to the altruism in the first period. Figure 2.4 illustrates how
the results change when the parameters of altruism change.
Again, using the fact that 1+r appears in all characteristic equations we can
substitute in to equations 2.9 and 2.14 to see how eˆ relates. First comparing eˆ
and e∗, the solution to the selfish model, results in:
1
pα1U
′(eˆ) + [ 1p
dxˆ1
θ
dθ
de − dxˆ1dθ dθds ][U′(xˆ1) − α1U′(Y − xˆ1)]
U′(xˆ1) dxˆ1dY + (1 − dxˆ1dY )α1U′(Y − xˆ1)
−
1
p
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
de −
dx∗1
dθ
dθ
ds
dx∗1
dY
= (2.24)
1
p [w
′(e∗) − w′(eˆ)]
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Figure 2.4: When the parent cares about the child, educational outcomes
improve. When the child cares about the parent, educational
outcomes also improve (though to a much smaller degree as
this factor enters less prominently in the parent’s objective
function) since the parent does not have to invest so much
into keeping up consumption through maintaining a balance
of power.
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Unlike in our previous analysis, we cannot determine that the left side of the
equation is positive, which would indicate that e∗ < eˆ. We can determine the
signs of the individual components, however, dxˆ1dY can never be more than one
due to the price having been normalized to one. From our first order conditions
in the second stage, we can conclude that U′(xˆ1) − α1U′(Y − xˆ1) > 0 because
α1 <
α1+θ−θα1
1−θ+θα2 =
U′(xˆ1)
U′(Y−xˆ1) . Since the α’s are less than 1, 1− θ+ θα2 < 1 and θ− θα1 > 0.
The other signs we have already discussed, leaving everything positive on the
left hand side except the term 1p
dxˆ1
θ
dθ
de − dxˆ1dθ dθds . This result means we cannot yet say
with certainty that adding in altruism to selfishness will increase educational
attainment.
We have the same difficulty when we compare the results of the mixed
model with those of the altruistic model:
1
pα1U
′(e) + [ 1p
dxˆ1
θ
dθ
de − dxˆ1dθ dθds ][U′(xˆ1) − α1U′(Y − xˆ1)]
U′(xˆ1)dxˆ1dY + (1 − dxˆ1dY )α1U′(Y − xˆ1)
− 1
p
U′(e˜)
U′[(yo − pe˜)(1 + r) + w(e˜)] =
(2.25)
1
p [w
′(e˜) − w′(eˆ)]
The left hand side is negative if 1pα1U
′(eˆ) is sufficiently small and would imply
that e˜ > eˆ, but lacking magnitudes, we cannot claim this in the theoretical case.
Still, by reflecting on these equations further we can learn a bit more about
this mixed solution eˆ. The first term in both equations 2.24 and 2.25 is the same.
Returning to manipulate the characteristic equation (2.23) of the mixed model,
we learn that this term is positive when
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1 + r >
w′(eˆ)
p
(2.26)
and negative when the sign is reversed. This inequality recalls the monetary
cost-benefit analysis of education. One invests up to the point that wages result-
ing from education are equal to the savings rate. According to purely monetary
considerations, the altruistic model over-invests in education and the selfish
model under-invests. Under different parameters or functional forms, the sign
of equation 2.26 can reverse, so the mixed model is the only one which contains
the possibility of actually arriving at the “efficient” result in monetary terms. A
parent who neither worships nor fears his child is preferred in this regard (and
there are probably psychological grounds upon which we would prefer this as
well).
Since this mixed model is so difficult to solve, it would be nice if we could
declare the solutions to the simpler selfish and selfless models as upper and
lower bounds. Though we have seen that this cannot be established from com-
parative statics, Figure 2.5 is a numerical example that illustrates the outcomes,
contrasting them to the selfish and selfless models.
2.6 Migration: Introducing the Threat Point
Most bargaining literature considers the possibility of exiting. I shall sketch out
this option conceptually, but only discuss intuitively, since we have complicated
the math enough. We shall allow the child an exit option, as is usually available
for children; many eventually stop living with their parents. This exit option
will parallel the concept of a threat point in the bargaining literature. In the-
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Figure 2.5: Comparing the mixed model with the selfish and selfless mod-
els: the mixed model is an intermediate result.
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ory, separation does not occur because the pair can always do better by staying
together. Here, however, exiting will be feasible because wages may be higher
elsewhere and this extra pay can only be accessible by moving. Also within the
literature both parties have threat points, but here we just consider the child’s
exiting option due to the two-stage nature of the game. The parent does not
need to consider exiting because he is the one who determines the equilibrium.
While the parent would indeed have some utility from separation as we shall
see, it will not be salient for the separation decision since the parent is the mas-
termind who drives the outcome toward that which he shall ultimately prefer.
Only the child’s exit option may be binding.
The child shall move to the city if his consumption as a city dweller is higher
than if he stayed home with his parent. Unfortunately, living in the city results
in higher expenses, like renting an apartment, but comes with higher income.
He will move if this city consumption is larger than what he gets at home. The
parent is left with utility (1+ r)s. The reverse of the previous inequality becomes
another constraint on the parent’s maximization problem. Without remittances,
the parent will never wish for the child to move out. The maximum value of (1+
r)s is found when e=0. The parent can always do better, as we saw earlier in the
selfish model, if he educates the child. Yet with this new constraint, education
levels may be held even lower. In the extreme, under the selfish model, the
parent may just choose not to educate the child at all! The fear of migration and
losing the investment in education overwhelms the parent and as a result no
education is provided for the child.
Fortunately this would never happen in the other selfless or mixed model
due to the intrinsic utility derived from education. What is more likely is that
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each consumes his income privately, yet there are remittances from child to par-
ent. α2 again will be the coefficient of concern of child for parent, now based on
reciprocality. If the child has had much education he will be appreciative and
support the parent, at least this is what the parent expects.2 The problem with
this specification is that there is no presentiment of a power struggle within the
home; savings can be zero, implying much higher levels of education are fea-
sible. This takes us full circle to an expectation of no bargaining, which is the
precise scenario we are moving away from. If the parent is going to consider
this to be a likely case, he must still consider the other scenario as feasible. Per-
haps a weighted average of the two in the objective function would reconcile
these diverse outcomes. Otherwise having this naive expectation can backfire,
as Frankenstein learned. Frankenstein formed his monster with the strongest,
most handsome body parts he could glean from the morgues, imagining that
his creation would be more perfect than any natural-born human. The result
was the opposite, more hideous than imagined. Blind expectation of an ideal
outcome is unwise and a wary parent may balance this with the possibility that
the child stays at home, in as weighted average of the two outcomes. There is
no need to discuss this further, as we have already seen how the presence of the
power variable tempers the educational attainment of the child.
2.7 Conclusion
Due to the inherent endogeneity of bargaining power between parents and chil-
dren, this relationship deserves special attention that pre-existing models of
2My brother tells stories of the parents of an Indian friend buying their son a fancy sports car
to bribe (guilt?) him into supporting them in old age. Not exactly an investment in education,
but an investment, none the less.
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intra-household bargaining typically do not allow for. In a marriage model,
even if the husband is similarly restricting a wife’s earning potential to main-
tain his power, there is always some sort of reservation utility entitling the wife
to a small bit of say. And if not, then we are in a dictator model, where the hus-
band completely dominates his wife and she has no chance of ever participating
in the bargaining process. The parent-child relationship is more dynamic, con-
sisting of two phases. At the beginning the child is always dependent on the
parent to make decisions; at some point the child’s bargaining power is purely
null. Later, as he grows, he is able to participate in family life. This work has
addressed this special situation with a comprehensive model considering the
two different periods a family experiences.
This two stage model of parent-child bargaining takes into account that the
parent is allowed to choose the child’s level of education and in essence has
determinism over the bargaining power in the second period. It considers the
duplicity of human nature, that parents and children are self-interested and self-
less. A self-interested parent limits a child’s education to maintain control over
consumption in the future while a selfless parent will have a higher level of
education investment in the child. Comparing contrasting models of a selfish
family to a selfless parent illustrates how the factors play out in a more realis-
tic but more complex model. While we arrive at a similar conclusion that the
returns to education will equal the returns to savings for the parent, and may
be monetarily efficient in this mixed model, the process by which we arrived at
this conclusion introduces a more thorough and dynamic method of thinking
about the relationship than either the intra-household literature or the bequest
literature offers. Future work will benefit from such a structure: this work is a
stepping-stone for future models of more complex families.
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CHAPTER 3
TEENAGE MOTHERS AND THEIR MOTHERS: INTERGENERATIONAL
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN SALVADOR, BRAZIL
3.1 Introduction
At a social agency in Northeast Brazil, I chatted with a group of children who
were drawing pictures of their families. The bright colors and undeveloped
technique were to be greeting cards for fund raising in Italy. I asked a girl to
tell me about the stick figures looming over a peaked roof house with an apple
tree (a scene strangely uncharacteristic for Brazilian favelas) and I was taken
aback when she pointed out her daughter. The social worker later explained
that in such circumstances the teenager’s mother ends up caring for the child
since adolescent mothers have little experience. Though I was surprised by the
identity of the figures in the drawing, many Brazilians would not be: the most
recent statistics indicate that one fifth of all births in Brazil were to women un-
der the age of twenty (UN 2007). This has not always been the case. The trend
of teenage motherhood increased from 12% of births to nearly 19% from 1986 to
1996 (Gupta and da Costa Leite 1999), reached a peak in 2001 at 21%, and since
has not dropped below 20% (UN).1 Though teenage motherhood is not desirable
from health and education perspectives, its prevalence and persistence indicate
that it is a social problem not easily solved; policy must address the issues asso-
ciated with the trend.
The household composition associated with teenage motherhood has also
1This data corresponds to the demographic story told by NGO leaders I met in Salvador,
though they imply that the increase in teenage mothers in the neighborhood is more recent.
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changed. In Brazil, a teen pregnancy would traditionally result in the daughter
leaving her family to live with the baby’s father. Now days, however, teen preg-
nancy is more accepted by mothers and they allow their daughters to live at
home (anecdotal). Though this demographic shift would be a fascinating topic
in and of itself, my study addresses the present relationships between these
young mothers who live with their mothers. Are their interactions character-
ized by conflicts or cooperation, and do these dynamics have repercussions for
the baby?
Sociologists have addressed several questions around this family structure.
Apfel and Seitz look at different ways inner-city grandmothers and teenage
mothers relate in the United States, and indicate that in the majority of the black
families they surveyed the grandmother assisted the mother in her parenting;
much less frequently was the teenager the sole care-giver or did the grand-
mother take over all the parenting duties (1991). Grandmother support may
be limited strategically, as Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders show that grandparents
give less in financial transfers to teenage mothers who have a younger sister
than to those who do not have a younger sister, to discourage the younger sis-
ter from repeating the event (2005). This restraint, however, brings up concerns
for the infants’ well being. Emotional support from grandparents is correlated
with teen mothers behaving more nurturingly toward their children than teen
mothers without this family structure (Oyserman, Radin, and Saltz 1994). This
positive effect on behavior is important because, in the United States at least,
teenage mothers are less nurturing than their elder counterparts. Perhaps for
this reason, children of teenage mothers fare worse than others academically
and tend to repeat the fertility trends of their parents (Card 1981); a grandpar-
ent presence may help to temper these unfortunate results.
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My study likewise addresses the issue of family structure and child welfare
among families who have a teen mother living with her mother in Salvador,
Brazil. The repercussions affecting an additional generation’s welfare make un-
derstanding the nature of the relationship between teens and their mothers par-
ticularly important. Differing preferences for the baby’s well-being and rela-
tive bargaining power in allocative consumption decisions could have signifi-
cant impacts on the child’s development. Since there are two factors influenc-
ing this outcome, my research questions are twofold: The first is to determine
which model of intrahousehold bargaining characterizes the relationship be-
tween teenage mothers and their mothers: unitary, collective, or neither. The
unitary model implies bargaining is not happening, while the collective model
implies cooperative bargaining with a Pareto optimal outcome. The second
question is to explore the women’s relationship with the child: is either of the
two willing to pay more for the child’s wellbeing? Two experiments and an ac-
companying household survey, all directed toward understanding intrahouse-
hold decision making, were applied to 152 families enrolled in the NGO Pastoral
da Crianc¸a in Salvador, Brazil. A trust game tested for Pareto efficiency in in-
come maximization for each family. I also designed a game to see if there were
differences in valuations of a child development toy as well as whose valuation
dominated in a bargaining setting; varying the endowment between mother
and daughter can reveal evidence of bargaining at the population level. The
game outcomes indicate that though most families did not reach Pareto optimal-
ity, generosity is the norm. There is little evidence of bargaining, but we do find
that members of Pareto efficient families had significantly lower valuations for
a child development toy than family members from non-efficent families. In the
majority of families, however, the behavior in the two games did not align with
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results predicted from standard models. Results offer insight to Bolsa Familia,
Brazil’s conditional cash transfer program aimed at improving child welfare.
Economists have long since taken up the question of intrahousehold alloca-
tion to analyze children’s welfare. Duncan Thomas, in one of the first articles
rejecting the unitary model in Brazil, finds improvements in the nutritional con-
sumption of children when their mother receives unearned income (1990). The
literature has continued in this tradition, with many analyses taking advantage
of conditional cash transfer programs as exogenous shocks impacting consump-
tion (discussed in section 2). Recently a few articles have touched on the inter-
generational aspect of intrahousehold bargaining. These consider the presence
of a grandparent with a pension in the household and determine if the pension
recipient is participating in the bargaining process and affecting child welfare
(Duflo 2003; Ponczek 2007). Most continue to make the gender comparison:
are grandfathers or grandmothers more concerned about child welfare? While
my question is indeed intergenerational, it is not inter-“genderational”. Instead
of having a man who likes alcohol and a woman with a strong preference for
child welfare, we have two women both with vested interest in the child (we
hope!). The bargaining dynamics will be quite different from the other families
explored in the economic literature.
Most intra-household studies require the presence of an exogenous income
shock to determine bargaining models. If private consumption patterns change
when one person receives more income, we can conclude bargaining is tak-
ing place. While much of this population receives money from the social wel-
fare program Bolsa Familia, this transfer is not exogenous since it was imple-
mented in 2003. To get around this challenge, the bargaining game simulates
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such events on a small scale. Coupled with a trust game, the results reveal how
the family operates. I have strategically selected two complementary games to
illustrate the key aspects of household dynamics.
The teenage mothers and their mothers also responded to a household sur-
vey. Descriptive statistics confirm a lack of exogeneity in income, so the exper-
imental data and psychological survey questions become an even more impor-
tant source of insight. In providing both revealed economic preferences through
the games as well as reported behavior and opinions, this interdisciplinary ap-
proach builds more complete understanding.
My results suggest that on average these families are fairly cooperative, with
mother and grandmother sharing similar concern for the baby, but the teenage
mother retains the role as principal caretaker. There are implicit policy im-
plications relating to Brazil’s conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Familia.
The conclusions imply that there is no need to target the teen mother with the
stipend, even though she is closer genetically and is delegated more responsibil-
ity for her child. However, as other authors wisely conclude, I, too, refrain from
making a “one-size-fits-all” generalization as we find much variation among
families as well as results un-categorizable within the predictions of standard
models (Iversen et. al. 2009).
3.2 Theoretical Framework
There are several competing models under which a family may operate when
engaging in household decision making. Each has its own characteristics as
well as policy implications for targeted cash transfer programs or other social
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interventions. The games, which shall later be described in detail, test two main
hypotheses relating to intrahousehold behavior as highlighted in these mod-
els. The first experiment is a trust game testing Pareto optimality adapted from
Iversen et. al. (2009). The second makes use of a Becker–deGroot–Marschak
mechanism to examine if valuations for a child development toy change when
the owner of the income changes. Using the results of these two games, in addi-
tion to being able to classify some individual families, we can determine under
which model a representative family may function and use this understand-
ing as a basis for policy suggestions. I first discuss the alternative models and
then explain the characteristics the games exploit to identify under which model
the families operate, covering the general concepts and intuitive results of each
model. I limit the discussion to one parent, since Brazil tends to be matriarchal:
31% of Brazilian families are headed by single women, and in my sample this
figure is almost double (IBGE 2006).
Since we are dealing with parents and children, it is safe to assume that at
one point in time the parent was making the decisions for the family. The uni-
tary model holds if the parent remains in this dictatorial role now that the teen
is grown, or if teen and parent are in such agreement that preferences are in
consensus. Since consumption decisions are made with only one utility func-
tion, Pareto efficiency is a characteristic of this family. When considering op-
portunities to increase family income in the parent-child context, the Rotten Kid
theorem explains how a Pareto optimal outcome could arise. Even though a
child is self-interested, since the parent is making final decisions regarding in-
come distribution for the household the child still finds it in his best interests
to maximize total family income.2 This also implies that no matter who is earn-
2Bergstrom finds a class of utility functions for which this does not hold and the child would
not maximize income. Without transferrable utility, a child can manipulate the utility possibil-
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ing income within the family, consumption decisions remain constant, aligning
with the dictator’s preferences. Given constant total income, there will be no
reward for a family member who earns more than the others; likewise if the
dictator suddenly earns less and the others more, all will still consume exactly
as before. With regard to policy, a targeted cash transfer would have no impact
in a family operating under the unitary model. To summarize, Pareto efficiency
and constant consumption decisions across different income patterns will be the
expected observed behavior for the unitary model.
If a family operates under a bargaining model, negotiation between mem-
bers allows them to arrive at consumption decisions. The literature on husbands
and wives suggest that most households bargain,3 and there is even some evi-
dence that children and parents also engage in bargaining. Iversen reports that
some adolescent boys in India pressure their parents to allow them to migrate
(2002). Berry finds varying results in child reading outcomes when an incen-
tive is directed toward a parent or a child (2009). The source of power in these
negotiations has been a subject of much discussion (see Agarawal, 1997), but
for economic purposes I focus on income, as I am examining this topic in light
of a targeted cash transfer. When a family member has more income she has
more say over how to spend it. Thus when the distribution of income is altered
through a transfer, the recipient spends more on herself, disproportionate as to
how prior income was used. This experimental outcome is predicted for both
types of bargaining models as long as income is a determinant of bargaining
power.
Bargaining models can be categorized based on efficiency. By definition,
ities frontier in his favor. However, I do not include these with my definition of the unitary
model, as the result falls well outside of the spirit of being “unitary.” (1989)
3see Alderman et. al. (1995) for a full discussion
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households are collective (cooperative) if efficiency is realized4 (Bourguignon,
Browning, and Chiappori, 2009). Non-cooperative families still hold potential
for an increase in utility without making anyone any worse off. In household
analysis of married couples, Lundberg and Pollack (1993) and Carter and Katz
(1997) suggest that inefficiency results when two individuals operate in sep-
arate spheres: with the division of labor between men’s work and women’s
work, some gains from comparative advantages are missed. Udry has found
evidence against Pareto Optimality for farming couples in Uganda, again based
on divisions of men’s crops and women’s crops (1996). Experimentally, Iversen
also rejects cooperation to a certain degree in that surplus maximization is not
always realized when couples in Uganda play a dictator game (2009). Yet these
analyses are about relationships between different genders. We may find that
women are more cooperative regarding childcare in the family. If Pareto opti-
mality is found not to hold, some social work encouraging cooperation may be
the appropriate policy response due to the concern that transfer money is not
used efficiently.
The predictions of the models with the experiments are summarized in the
quadrants below:
Trust Game
Outcomes P. Efficiency P. Inefficiency
Book Bargaining Collective Non-Coop.
Game No Bargaining Unitary Unexpected
4Basu (2006) has shown that inter-temporarily this is not necessarily true: if earned income is
a factor of bargaining power, one member may limit earnings of another so as not to lose future
power. Yet again, this behavior is hardly in the spirit of “cooperative” so I shall not consider it
to be so in this definition.
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Classic intrahousehold analysis rejects the unitary model if the consumption
of private goods change when exogenous private income changes (Browning et
al 1994). To confirm that the family maintains Pareto efficiency, a more com-
plicated test checks that ratios of the marginal propensities to consume a good
with respect to the income of both spouses, at a constant family income, are
the same across goods (Bourguignon et al 1993). Only recently has methodol-
ogy developed to include simpler test of Pareto optimality, and even then these
techniques are feasible only when two distribution factors (power variables in-
fluencing how decisions are made) are observed (Bourginion, Browning, and
Chiappori, 2009). Unfortunately not every data set of consumption goods and
income will be appropriate for these techniques. Typical categories of private
goods are men and women’s clothing. Yet because my population of interest is
women, we cannot discern between clothing use when this category is consid-
ered. I confirm that many families indeed share clothes, likely out of necessity,
indicating that poverty may confound supposed observations of private goods.
Furthermore, it is difficult to make a case that income is exogenous unless it
comes from an external shock and there is an absence of selection bias. Finally,
distribution factors are likewise not necessarily exogenous; my theoretical work
illustrates how a parent’s choices when the child is young may influence the
future bargaining power of a child (Reynolds, 2010). Yet since the principle be-
hind the empirical technique that rejects the unitary model is an inspiration for
experimental design, I continue the discussion as a reference for contrasts and
similarities to my experimental methodology.
To test if a bargained model prevails in the household, economists use sur-
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vey data on individually consumable goods and determine if a constant propor-
tion of income is spent on a good no matter who earns the income (implying the
unitary model), or if the proportion of income spent on a good fluctuates with
respect to who is bringing in more wealth to the family (implying the collective
model, or a non-cooperative model) (Browning et al 1994). It is this principle
which is the motivation for the experiment which tests a change in consumptive
behavior arising from a change in income. While the experiment is a contrived
scenario, it is designed to parallel this standard statistical analysis.
The challenge for the researcher is establishing the exogeneity of the earn-
ings. While one family member may be earning more, this may be the result of
bargaining itself: perhaps one member takes advantage of the other by forcing
her to work. Thus sudden changes in policy or income shocks can be advanta-
geous to this analysis. The data has been often associated with natural exper-
iments to ensure exogeneity. Legal changes in transfers is the obvious choice:
the sudden, unexpected shift or increase in income to a certain group is pre-
cisely the type of exogenous income needed to analyze the bargaining model.
These analyses of natural experiments have been applied to changes in cash
transfer programs around the world (Oportunidades (Bobonis 2004), Bolsa Fa-
milia (Braido et. al. 2009), Romanian and British child allowances (Sahn and
Gerstle 2004) (Lundberg et. al. 1997) among others). Since I find no such shocks
available (nor have the funds to implement such a shock), I employ experimen-
tal methodology to simulate such an event. In addition, the trust game sheds
light on the efficiency of the family.
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3.3 Experimental Design
Experimental games have long helped economists better understand family dy-
namics. Corfman and Lehmann find couples’ behavior to be cooperative in de-
cision making; preference intensity is a stronger predictor of the decision made
than bargaining power (1987). Bateman and Munro performed an experiment
on household behavior, finding that individual lottery preferences are similar
to the couple’s joint lottery preferences (2005). Berry also used a field exper-
iment in India to determine that parents and children bargain over a child’s
educational behaviors (2009). Ashraf looks at husband and wife banking in the
Philippines to find that expenditure choices differ whether actions are public or
private (2009). Iversen et. al. uses the dictator and trust games with variations
in payoffs in Uganda to test intrahousehold bargaining models between hus-
bands and wives and he rejects any one model as dominant (2009). Hoffmann
staged a field experiment in Uganda discovering that usage of mosquito nets
varies based on the gender of the recipient in the family (2009).
To give fair credit, my experiments are adaptations of Iversen’s and Hoff-
mann’s protocol. The adaptation from Hoffmann’s experiment tests the hy-
pothesis of the existence of bargaining in economic decision making (related
to a product for the baby’s welfare) between teenage mothers and their moth-
ers while Iversen’s trust game tests for Pareto efficiency. With my participants,
the trust game is repeated, and the bargaining game played only once. Though
the family plays each of these three games, they are informed that the payoffs
will be realized for just one of them, randomly chosen after the survey is com-
plete. Participants were paid in vouchers for a neighborhood convenience store
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or grocery.5
3.3.1 The Trust Game
Let me first describe the trust game, and the implications of the potential out-
comes. The participants are introduced to a “magic” hat. Anything that is put
into the hat doubles in value.6 (The doubling was illustrated with candy, which
works well to pique interest and gain goodwill.) The participants then are given
five coupons of fifty cents (R$2.50 in total, approx US$1.75) in play money rep-
resenting the vouchers.7 The teenager is the designated owner of the hat. (The
order of who is the owner is randomized, but for example’s sake let’s make it
the teenager. Note that while they play the first time they know that they will be
playing a second time with the other person as the owner. However all actions
are all kept secret; even payouts at the end are given privately in envelopes.)
Completing step-by-step comprehension questions, mother and daughter are
informed that everyone, including the enumerators, will have an opportunity
to place all, some, or none of the coupons in the hat. The enumerators’ values
will be randomly selected also between 0 and R$2.50. Their contribution intro-
duces some noise so that teenager will not be able to calculate the contribution
of her mother should this be the activity chosen for payout.8 The placement of
5Using actual money was originally proposed but the leaders in the Pastoral were concerned
that this could be used for drugs. The enumerators were also concerned for safety. Vouchers
for a local store was the optimal solution pleasing the enumerators and the leaders, and still
allowing for the participants to have a wide span of choices regarding what they purchased.
6In a pilot study the contents were multiplied by 1.5 instead of doubling. This math was too
difficult for the participants to grasp - they could not calculate the reward of how much came
out of the hat - so this variation was abandoned.
7The number of representative bills was made odd to ensure a social norm like a 50-50 split
was not feasible, giving us more insight into personal preferences.
8If a participant thinks that both enumerators placing zero is of high probability, then that
may bias her contribution upward if she is concerned about a reprimand from the owner of the
53
contributions is done secretly, in envelopes, so no one will perceive the value
of the contribution or lack thereof. The participants are reminded that anything
they do not place in hat is theirs to keep but does not double, and all that goes
into the hat doubles and goes to the teenage mother. The enumerators record
the contributions, and the game is repeated (all contributions from the first game
remain unknown), this time with the grandmother designated owner of the hat.
We can check that the participants understood the game by confirming self-
interested behavior: when the participants are owners of the hat, they should
place the entire R$2.50 in the hat.9 Once it is confirmed that both partici-
pants understand, we can test for Pareto efficiency. When this game is played
among strangers, the owner of the hat redistributes the income after all contri-
butions have been made and doubled. Since the participants are not strangers–
in fact they are members of the same household with plenty of interaction for
redistribution–so I do not include this step in the game. Furthermore, any re-
sponses to questions regarding redistribution are not necessarily truthful. A
mother may pretend to give a portion back to her daughter but after the enu-
merators leave, snatch it back. Leaving this step implicit does not affect the im-
plications in our game, though, which is to determine if the family is behaving in
a Pareto optimal manner: do both participants place the entire R$2.50 in the hat
when they do not own it? As discussed in the previous section, unitary and co-
operative bargaining models predict Pareto optimality, while non-cooperative
hat. However I doubt this is the case. A fair number had enough trouble with addition and
multiplying by two. Initially in the pilot study the contents of the hat increased by 1.5, but this
math was beyond complicated for the participants. I confidently assert that no one was calculat-
ing the 1 in 25 probability about that both enumerators would draw a zero. The emphasis was
on the enumerators contributing something between 0 and 2.5, just as the participants were, not
that this something might be zero.
9This could be rational if the owner of the hat knew that the other would appropriate all
gains after the game was over. Then out of maliciousness, not irrationality, might money be
withheld from the hat. Unlikely this is the case here, since I found no significant difference in
preferences for living with the other between rational players and “irrational” players.
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bargaining does not.
In the unitary case, as long as the daughter’s consumption is a normal good,
the daughter will help her mother maximize income and contribute all to the
hat. The mother will do the same, too. For collective models, theory indicates
that once the amount spent on the public good is decided upon, the rest of the
income is divided according to a sharing rule (Browning et al, 1994). The shar-
ing rule allows each member to maximize her own utility subject to the individ-
ual budget constraint to determine individual consumption. For the purposes
of this trust game, if the sharing rule is unrelated to the final distribution of in-
come, the result is Pareto Optimal as income maximization is always preferred
for both players. Yet if the sharing rule is determined by ex-post income dis-
tribution there is a possibility that the result is not Pareto Optimal. If, say, the
sharing rule is based entirely on the fraction of income after the game is played,
then if person one contributes all to person two, person one is left with no bar-
gaining power at all. If person two does not sufficiently care about person one,
person one may prefer to keep the money for herself. Even though this model
is technically collective, the non-Pareto optimal outcome and the perceived un-
fairness of this sharing rule allow us to consider it to be an uncooperative model.
Certainly the spirit of cooperation does not hold.
Though we are interested in family structure, this game also reveals indi-
vidual preferences. Were an individual purely interested in monetary gain, the
decision of how much to place in the hat would be straightforward: one only
places if she expects to get more back than she puts in. With this logic, we expect
an all-or-nothing approach with contributions dichotomized between 2.50 or 0.
There are, in fact, many intermediate values chosen, implying non-cooperative
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families require a more complex model, likely involving altruism. I present a
discussion of such a model in the appendix, though it is not necessary for the
basic concept that without income maximization, efficiency eludes the family.
3.3.2 The Bargaining Game
The other experiment tests additional aspects of household structure with an
application of the Becker–deGroot–Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 1964,
Friedman and Sunder 1994). I measure individual and shared willingness-to-
pay for a cloth counting book, with the contrast between the individual and
joint valuations revealing bargaining power. If both have established individual
valuations, we would expect the joint valuation to be the result of bargaining.
With a teen’s valuation x, a grandmother’s valuation y, and a joint valuation y,
we would conclude that the grandmother has more power in this relationship as
the bargained valuation was equal to her individual valuation. Furthermore, I
take the willingnesses-to-pay as a proxy for the value placed on child education.
The participants are informed that if this is to be the experiment for which
the pay-out takes place, the grandmother receives R$3 in vouchers and the baby
book shopping is done with the R$9 the teenager will receive. (Again, this is
only one treatment. In another treatment the roles are reversed.) The partici-
pants are introduced to the counting book, a product I developed especially for
this experiment. Not only are children’s books a small market for middle class
Brazilians, they are much too expensive for the impoverished. These products
(few and far between) cost at least R$20, more than the minimum wage for day
laborers. Only 10.6% of families in the study had baby books. The counting
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Figure 3.1: The Counting Book
book I designed was created in sort of a cottage industry, silk screened and sewn
locally with potential to be much more affordable. Being made of strong cloth
also makes it much more durable for babies than cardboard books on the mar-
ket. The book can be washed, an advantage for those with messy children (and
who doesn’t have messy children!). Finally, it is of developmental value since it
can be used to teach counting as well as to familiarize children with books. The
delight of the leaders of the Pastoral indicates the book’s novelty and they all
appreciated it’s educational value (see photos).
The teenager can purchase the book in the following manner: She does not
know the price of the book at the imaginary store, but she can send a fictitious
messenger with the money to purchase the book. She tells the messenger up
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to what price he should pay for the product.10 Anything higher than this value
he should not buy it and she keeps the entire R$9, but at a price equal to or
lower than the amount indicated he buys the book for her and brings back the
change. The price of the book will be drawn randomly, a whole number on
[0,R$9].11 However, this messenger forgets the amount the teenage mother told
him and so he asks the grandmother for this same information: up to what
amount should he pay for the book? Once more he forgets and asks both of
them together for an amount. Finally he “arrives” at the store, and with all
these amounts floating in his head, he randomly (again through a drawing)
remembers one of them to compare to the store price and purchases accordingly.
All change returns to the teenage mother. After hearing this story of how the
game is played and answering the practice questions, the participants report
their individual valuations at the same time, and following this report a joint
valuation. The enumerators leave the room to allow for unobserved discussion
of the joint valuation.
To analyze bargaining power, I assume that the joint valuation is the bar-
gained result, and the two individual valuations are what each would choose
were she able to make the purchase entirely on her own. This is not an exact
10I initially considered making the messenger a “she” but there was too much pronoun con-
fusion in the instructions for this to be practical without awkward name repetition. Anyway,
there does not seem to be a distrust in men to do daily tasks, and furthermore, the participants
all understood he was fictitious; the fact that the enumerators were women should ameliorate
concerns about the messenger’s gender.
11We can see that the valuation she selects reveals her willingness to pay, approximating her
utility of the good in dollars. Suppose U(x) = v∗. If she chooses vˆ lower than v∗, then for any
price v on (vˆ, v∗) she does not purchase the good. Instead she receives income y which is less
than U(x) + y − vˆ; she should choose a higher v. If she instead chooses a v¯ greater than v∗, then
for v on (v∗, v¯) she purchases the good, but her utility U(x) + y − v¯ is less than income y. Her only
choice for v that ensures that in every scenario she receives a utility of y is to choose v∗ = U(x).
In summary, this mechanism is truth-revealing, for the participant has no incentive to name a
higher price and risk paying more than she would like for the good. Nor would the participant
choose a price lower than her true willingness to pay since between these two prices she finds
the value of the good higher than its price and would actually prefer to own the good.
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measure of utility, since the decision may be made considering how the money
left over will be divided. A family with a sharing rule in favor of the grand-
mother will have the teenager inflating her valuation of the baby book as each
dollar left over will not give her very much utility; she will find it preferable to
spend on the baby book rather than receive a small fraction of the cash. When
she makes the choice using her own money, she is deciding how to divide it
between private goods and the baby book. When she makes the choice using
her mother’s money, she has a smaller fraction of the change going toward her
private expenditures, whereas when she owns the endowment, she receives a
larger share. She will spend more on the book when the endowment is her
mother’s, until the benefit of the marginal dollar spent on the book equals the
sharing rule. In the cooperative bargaining case, this implies that since each
individual valuation is inflated, the joint valuation (accurately bargained to bal-
ance preferences, not valuations) has the potential to be below both individual
valuations, but never greater. In the non-cooperative case, the inefficiencies re-
main in the joint decision, and a bargained decision falls between individual
valuations; all else equal it would be larger than the cooperative case. (See the
technical appendix for a mathematical discussion.)
We identify a family as unitary if all valuations are the same; we can imagine
this family fits the unitary model in the consensus sort of way. We could also
confirm the unitary model if the individual valuations were not the same, but
one joint valuation equal to the higher of the two. (We may also suspect a dic-
tator if the valuation is equal to the lower of the two, but this is less conclusive
since this could also occur in cooperative bargaining). Furthermore, if the “dic-
tator” is owner of the R$9 endowment, we could decisively conclude that she
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has a dictatorial say over her daughter’s financial decisions.12
In addition to varying the owner of the endowment, I also allow for a few
cases where the joint valuation is reported first to determine if time is a factor
in valuation. If it is, then we have to take this into account when analyzing the
bargaining story. Unfortunately I have few observations where the joint valu-
ation is given before the individual valuations due to unforseen hindrances13
and slow Brazilian maneuvering through the multiple leadership layers of a
very decentralized Pastoral da Crianc¸a. I decided to sacrifice the numbers of
this variation to emphasize the other source of variation, more in line with the
bargaining literature. I emphasize the variation in endowments because this
is the variation needed to identify bargaining at the population level. If aver-
age valuations change when endowments change, there is evidence of bargain-
ing at the population level. This strategy parallels standard empirical method-
ology which tests the collective model by measuring changes in consumption
patterns caused by varying exogenous income. Additional income to an indi-
vidual member may alter the bargaining power in the family, which will change
consumption if preferences between bargainers are different. If no evidence of
changes in consumption is found, a unitary model would be more likely. In our
experiment I shall test if the average joint valuation is different in the different
treatments; in a population that functions primarily under the unitary model
there should be no change in valuation based on the endowment.
If a bargaining family, cooperative or non-cooperative, has minimal utility
12We could imagine that a dictator who was altruistic changing her valuation to a higher one
after coming into discussion with the other person. Initially she only looks at her benefit from
the book, but then the other indicates how much she enjoys it as well and this changes the
dictator’s utility function. However, since there is still a discussion where the dictator listens
to an expression of happiness by the other person, for our practical purposes, it is a bargained
outcome.
13the worst rains in 30 years, my fragile stomach, and a bus strike
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from public goods and an extreme all-or-nothing sharing rule depending on
endowment ownership, we shall have interesting findings. For example, if the
grandmother expects her daughter to spend all income on private goods, when
the teenager has the endowment, the grandmother will choose the maximum
value, R$9, for the baby book valuation. The grandmother will have no benefit
otherwise, since all the teenage’s expenditures would be private. Likewise if the
teenager expected no benefit from her mother’s expenditures, she, too, would
choose the highest valuation for the counting book when her mother had the
endowment. In the trust game, no money would be contributed to the hat in
this type of family since the great majority of the winnings will be spent on
private expenditures. Here the non-altruistic individual will do better keeping
the money for herself than allowing the other to purchase privately.
Looking at population averages, combining the results of both games we can
see what the models would predict for a representative family. In the bargain-
ing game, let vmN represent the average valuation, where m is the owner of the
endowment (g for grandmother and t for teenager) and N is the source of the
valuation (G for grandmother, T for teenager, and J for joint). The chart below
that indicates what results each model predicts for the population in each of the
two games.14
14The dictator case is limited to a smaller subset of individuals who do not own the endow-
ment. Having the power while owning the endowment might be a case of cooperative bargain-
ing rather than dictatorship.
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Population Model Trust Game Bargaining Game
Unitary Consensus Both contribute 2.50 all valuations equal
Unitary Dictator Both contribute 2.50 vtJ = vtG or vgJ = vgT
Cooperative Both contribute 2.50 vgJ , vtJ, vgT , vtT ,
Bargaining vgG , vtG
Non-Coop. Barg. Contributions vgJ , vtJ, vgT , vtT ,
w/public good are 3 (0, 2.50) vgG , vtG
Bargaining Both contribute 0 vgT = R$9
w/no public good and vtG = R$9
and extreme sharing
rule
Our final point of analysis is a test if either teenagers or grandmothers as
a population seem to be valuing the baby product more than the other as well
as addressing the question are families, as represented by the joint valuation,
willing to pay more when the teenage mother receives the transfer as opposed to
when the grandmother does? Though not an exact measure of utility, it suggests
how money is spent in these families. If one group is willing to spend more than
another, there could be policy implications for targeted transfer programs such
as Bolsa Familia. A regression of the valuations on the sources of variation as
well as the individual and family characteristics helps to determine the answer
to this question. (See the technical appendix for further detail.)
The treatments are randomized in the following way. There are 2 experi-
ments, the trust game with two treatments (A and B) alternating who was the
owner of the hat first and the bargaining game with four (C D E F), varying both
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endowment ownership and the order of joint and individual valuations. Survey
packets alternated AC AD BC BD AE AF BE BF (with a time period when only
the first four were used since I thought we did not have enough time to gather
more observations with the variation in joint valuation coming first – random
as well, based on the rain). The enumerators were not informed of this method-
ology and took the next packet to the next household.
3.4 The Population
The port city of Salvador is presently the third largest city in Brazil, though it
was the country’s first capital. It’s historical roots of slavery to support sugar
production make it the center of Afro-Brazilian culture, but also leaves it with
the highest unemployment rate of the larger cities (IBGE, 2009). Salvador is no-
torious among the Brazilians for a leisurely work pace; a journalist who had
spent some time in Africa told me that even Ghanians complained about the
lateness of the Brazilians in international meetings. On the other hand, the
Soteropolitanos are also known for being the happiest of Brazilians and for host-
ing the largest street carnival in the world.
The participants in the study were recruited from the community organiza-
tion Pastoral da Crianc¸a. This decentralized organization targets poor families
with children six years or younger to improve their health and nutrition; preg-
nant women are also served. Every month the local volunteer leaders visit the
families to provide guidance and support. Also occurring monthly is a commu-
nity weighing, usually at the neighborhood church. The local leaders come to-
gether and weigh the children, play games, and hand out snacks. Underweight
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children are targeted with special attention for the coming months. Established
in 1983, this organization is highly respected in Brazil, and has expanded inter-
nationally to twenty other countries including a few in Africa and Asia. It is
sponsored by UNICEF and has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
The Pastoral in Salvador is organized into three regions. The first region
runs along the Atlantic coast, where the prime real estate is located. The second
region runs along the bay, and the third covers the center of the city and a bit of
the periphery. We worked in the second and third regions, those with a higher
concentration of poorer communities and therefore, I suspected, a higher con-
centration of teenage mothers. Since the focus of the organization is on children
and pregnant women, the Pastoral collects data mainly on the children. There-
fore only the leader who worked with the mother herself knew the age of the
mother. While we did not take data on those who were not in our profile, my
enumerators estimate that more than seventy-five percent of teenage mothers fit
into our profile. With the help of the 46 parochial coordinators and a plethora of
community coordinators (also volunteers) we were able to consult with most lo-
cal leaders. Around 100 of these presently worked with a teenage mother who
lived with her mother, grandmother (5), or mother-in-law (17), and had been
participating in the organization in the year 2008. This time lag was to prevent
selection bias, in case anyone would join the organization just to participate for
remuneration. In a close to complete census, we surveyed all mothers who were
19 or younger at the time of the interview and lived with their mothers.
In most cases, the leader introduced us to the teenager and the enumerators
scheduled a time to return when both she and her mother would be present.
The leader would accompany the enumerators to the house and stay only if
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the neighborhood was dangerous enough to warrant; whenever possible we
asked the leader to leave so the participant would not be influenced by her
presence. In return for her assistance, the leader received the remaining su-
permarket vouchers that the family did not win, though most leaders seemed
as though they would have helped without this benefit: they liked the topic
of study and were glad to give their mothers a chance to win some money for
participation.
We were unable to interview 18 families. Four suspicious grandmothers
did not wish to let their daughters participate. One could not take time off
from work to participate. Three moved and these we did not attempt to track
down due to the safety of entering unknown neighborhoods without introduc-
tion. Two were our fault - we double booked and the families did not want to
reschedule. Four belonging to one leader could not be interviewed because we
lost contact with the leader - her father was in the hospital for months and then
she traveled once he died. The final four were in a districts where the leaders
did not venture themselves. Our census may also be incomplete from a leader’s
oversight. Occasionally a leader from 2008 would have left and been replaced
with another. We did our best to track down everyone, even from the several
communities that closed in 2008. However, these closings were due to lack of
volunteers anyway, so it is not likely that there were many mothers registered
in the first place. Without the data the ages of the mothers of all the children
served by the Pastoral, it is impossible to know the percentage of children that
are born to teen mothers, but from our census and some back of the envelope
calculations, it seems that the teen mothers in the Pastoral responsible for around
15% of children whereas the national average is 20%. I suspect this discrepancy
comes from the limited coverage of the Pastoral, which serves just below 10% of
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poor children in Salvador.
3.5 Results
Comparing some statistics from the survey to indicators used by the Pastoral
suggests that this population is more at risk than the average child served.
Within the 2nd and 3rd regions of Salvador 5% of children had diarrhea in the
last month, as reported by their mothers. In this population of only teen moth-
ers, we find 35.5%.15 16 The World Health organization recommends that babies
not be weaned until two years and breast fed exclusively for six months. Of the
114 children under two years of age, only 67.5% are still breastfed. Of the 47
infants in my sample six months or younger, 31.9% are exclusively breastfeed
and of the 41 infants four months or younger, 34.1% are exclusively breastfed.17
Finally, within the Pastoral 87.15% of children have complete vaccinations for
their age while I find that 71% of children of teenagers have not completed the
vaccinations within 2 months of the schedule18, however, within 1 year and two
months of the schedule, 85% of children of teenagers do complete the regimen.
Unfortunately we cannot compare this to the Pastoral, since this statistic is not
offered, but the World Health Organization reports that in 2008 vaccine cover-
age in the entire country was 96%.
15The age of the baby is positively correlated with diarrhea reporting (.24 at 99%), implying
that these numbers are probably not skewed by new mothers incorrectly identifying infant feces
as diarrhea.
16All statistics in this paragraph calculated from my data are significantly different from the
comparison reference with 99% confidence.
17In the Pastoral 62.2% (region 2) and 53.4% (region 3) of six-month-olds are exclusively breast
fed and 59.3% (region 2) and 87.5% (region 3) of four-month-olds are exclusively breast fed.
18Many children over four did not have vaccines for tetravirus and rotavirus, so I did not
include these this in the calculation of the statistic, though they are in the official time line.
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Comparisons to national level statistics also indicate that this is a vulnerable
population. Descriptive statistics of the participants are presented in Table 3.1.
Of these families 61% are below Brazil’s poverty line of R$140 per capita income
per month (US$70)19 , as confirmed by a majority of families receiving Bolsa
Familia, Brazil’s welfare program. It is interesting to note, however, that we
have some outliers of wealthier families; one grandfather even worked for an
oil company and refused to tell us his income. Also note that these teen mothers
on average are having children at a younger age than their mothers, reflecting
the demographic trend discussed earlier.
The matriarchal domination is highlighted in these families as well. The
2000 census reports that 25.9 percent of households in the urban northeast are
headed by females, while in this population 72 percent of the households are,
even though in some of these families the grandmother is married20 (IBGE,
2002). Table 3.2 also shows that while men are not absent from the household,
monogamy is not the norm. Thus men may be less active in the baby’s life, indi-
cating that the analysis of the power dynamic of the longer lasting relationship
between grandmother and teen is most appropriate.
In order to establish the necessity of an experimental approach, let us also
look at the variables that would be used under a traditional econometric ap-
proach. Recall that this methodology requires demand curves for private goods
(or public ones) to be analyzed when exogenous income shocks occur. Usually
items like women’s clothing and men’s clothing can be analyzed when looking
19I adjusted the wages up R$50 of ten formal sector salaried workers interviewed before
February 1st, 2009 to correspond to the minimum wage change on that date.
20This figure is two and a half percentage points higher (though not significantly different)
when the question who has the most authority in the household is asked. However, the “fam-
ily head” question is more formal and likely to reflect an official stance to outsiders, whereas
household authority may have to do more with internal politics.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics.
Salvador's
N=152                       R$1 ~ US$0.55 Minimum Mean Maximum Average
Age of teenage mother 14.04 17.73 (1.48) 19.99
Age of teenage mother when 1st child was born 13.08 16.39 (1.54) 19.95
Age of grandmother 32.16 44.92 (7.21) 72.49
Age of teen's eldest child 0.019 1.35 (1.26) 6.46
Sex of teen's eldest child 41%  female
Age of grandmother when 1st child was born +                        11 19.00 (3.89) 31
Household size 3 6.38 (2.19) 12 3.47*
Percentage of families that own their own home 76.32% 79.16%*
Percentage of families with debt? +                        77.48% 54.15%***
Value of annual income R$310 R$10,059 (6,879) R$36,984 R$23,568*
Value of annual consumption R$2,901 R$10,447 (5,164) R$36,498
Per capita annual consumption R$322 R$1,807 (1,048) R$7299
Durables R$0 R$1,127 (1181) R$7911
% of families with at least 1 baby book ++ 10.60%
Percentage of the families who don't receive Bolsa Familia, 
Brazil's conditional cash transfer program for education & health 40.13% 86.06%**
Of families who receive Bolsa Familia, how much they receive R$20 R$96.51 (39.17) R$185
Religious distribustion of the teen mothers
43% Catholic         
14% evangelical 
42% no religion
(no age/sex 
distinction)
Religious distribustion of the grandmothers
62% Catholic    
23% evangelical 
14% no religion
61% Catholic*         
13% evangelical    
18% no religion
Race distribution of the teens
20%  black          
49%  brown        
38% pardo             
3% white                       
1% yellow
(no age/sex 
distinction)
Race distribution of the grandmothers
30% black          
38% brown         
25% pardo              
4% white                     
3% yellow
20%  black*              
55%  brown/pardo          
23% white                        
0% yellow                 
1% indig.
Notes:  Standard erors are in parentheses
 Durables include TV, radio, large kitchen appliances, cell phones, car, etc. 
+ n=151 
++ Only six families have more than one baby book
*Brazilian Comparatiave Statistics from IBGE
**Brazilian Comparatiave Statistics from IPEA
***Brazilian Comparatiave Statistics from ETENE
Table 3.2: Distribution of Husbands in the Household. This chart emphasizes
the lack of male consistency in these households. Over 40% of households have
no conjugal figure for either teenager or grandmother. The staying power of
men is low: a mere 18% of grandmothers are still married to the teen’s father.
Only 4% of families exhibit monogamy in that both the teen’s father and the
baby’s father are a part of the household, although conditional on not being
married, 39% of teenagers continue to date the baby’s father.
Teen married Teen married
n=152 to baby's father to someone else Teen unmarried
Grandmother married to Teen's father 4% 1% 14% 18%
Grandmother married to someone else 9% 0% 15% 24%
Grandmother not married 14% 3% 41% 58%
26% 3% 70% 100%
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Table 3.3: Private Goods. The goods listed here are those that have the poten-
tial to be assignable. Yet the high level of sharing of some of these products
and the low level of expenditures on those which are not shared suggest the
questionability of their assignability for this population.
 n= 152
Potentially Private goods Grandmother     Teen
 at least 1 person indicated  
consumption was shared
Clothes 40% 54% 56%
Jewelry 23% 33% 68%
Make-up 7% 20% 52%
Leisure (Parties, Shows, Sports) 7% 13% -
Beauty Salon 11% 9% -
Percentage of individuals who 
purchased the good
husband and wife. However, since this population is composed of two women,
clothing may not be an appropriate category. Even consumption goods like
feminine products cannot be used as private goods since many of the grand-
mothers are still menstruating; there are cases where mother and daughter both
have babes in arms. I included potentially private goods in the survey, asking
each individually how much they spent on these in the last three months. I also
asked if they were truly private, or if they were shared.21
From Table 3.3, the high level of sharing does not make these satisfactory
private goods, and the two categories that remain, leisure and salon, have
few people spending. This again emphasizes the poverty of the population;
without much disposable income, private goods become a luxury, infrequently
purchased. When all of these categories are considered simultaneously, only
62 teenagers and 47 grandmothers in 81 families have private good expendi-
ture. That means there is no observation of private expenditure for 47% of the
population. The correlation of the variables ‘amount of private good expen-
diture per family’ and ‘per capita yearly consumption’ is significantly positive
(.3267, pvalue=.0000) as is the correlation with value of family’s assets (.2759,
21If one person said they were shared, even if the other did not, I counted them as shared.
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pvalue=.0006).22 These correlations suggest that were we to analyze demand
for private goods, there would be a systematic lack of information about the
behavior of the poorest families. Individually we do find grandmothers’ in-
come correlated with individual private expenditures (.3217, pvalue=.0017) but
teenagers’ private expenditures is not significantly correlated with their income
nor with the grandmother’s income. Average individual expenditure condi-
tional on having spent is R$72 for both grandmothers and teenagers, though
teens have a higher standard error (124 vs. 82).
Even if satisfactory sources of private goods were identified, while there are
sources of unearned income, as shown in Table 3.4, all of these may have selec-
tion bias, making standard analysis invalid. Bolsa Familia requires families to
apply, and since it has been around for six years, with much publicity, people
now come to expect such subsidies. Personality factors may affect teenagers’
reception of money from the infants’ fathers; more forceful teens may extract
higher payments.
It is clear that standard techniques will be impossible to use with this popu-
lation. Therefore, the games become the primary economic methodology of ad-
dressing the question of intra-household bargaining. Yet due their limited scope
I included survey questions to inquire about decision making in the family to
amplify the picture of household dynamics. In separate rooms both mother and
grandmother responded individually to inquiries about who performed certain
tasks as well as who masterminded them. They could respond with up to two
people who made the decision, listed in order of primary and secondary impor-
tance. Table 3.5 has the results.
22Caveat: the correlation with income is barely positive, and not significant (.0751,
pvalue=.3595)
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Table 3.4: Sources of Unearned Income. Categories are not mutually exclu-
sive. While most grandmothers receive unearned income in the form of Bolsa
Familia, Brazil’s conditional cash transfer program, and a large proportion of
teenagers receive money from the baby’s father, this unearned income is not ex-
ogenous. Bolsa Familia has selection effects and has been available for many
years. The teen’s personality may also play a great role in her relationship with
the baby’s father. In only 17% of families both teenager and grandmother have
no source of unearned income whatsoever.
Teen Mother Grandmother
n 152 152
Bolsa Familia 3% 57%
Pension (including child support for teen) 1% 5%
Money from Baby's Father 44% -
Other 11% 22%
No unearned income 51% 30%
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of a few categories, there is
far more disagreement than concordance. In some cases, that disagreement is
both participants claiming responsibility for the act (see column % of families
where both teenager and grandmother were reported as important by both and
had disagreed on who was of principal importance). Only in one decision mak-
ing category was there a relatively large agreement that another besides the teen
mother and grandmother was participating: paying for the teenagers’ clothes.
Here the teen’s husband or boyfriend was referenced. Also interesting of note
are the categories of low disagreement: who physically takes the baby to the
health clinic and decisions regarding the grandmother. This suggests that the
grandmother has a fair bit of autonomy and that there are some areas of her life
where bargaining is not taking place, at least not with her daughter. The fourth
and fifth column illustrate the low degree of potentially cooperative thinking.
This column represents the families where both mother and daughter reported
that they both are responsible for the task. The lack of families with both mem-
bers agreeing that they are both responsible suggests a separate spheres men-
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Table 3.5: Concordance About Who Makes the Decision. Teenagers and
grandmothers responded to these questions in separate rooms and had the
option of listing up to two individuals who were responsible for the different
duties. If agreement on teen is significantly different (at 95% or higher) than
agreement on grandmother, then the larger of the two is in bold. Column “Dis-
agreement” notes the high degree of discord in many topics. Yet column six
shows that though there was discord, in a few instances both grandmother and
teenager were listed by both as participants in the activity; numbers are bold
in this column if differing significantly from zero. For example, though 43% of
families disagree about who decides if the baby needs clothes and who buys
the clothes for the baby, the families are more united about deciding if the baby
needs clothes since in 3% of families both grandma and teen listed both as im-
portant, while none did for the question about who buys the clothes. Likewise
column seven shows that though concordance in column one or two may be
high, both teenager and grandmother are recognized as playing an important
role. Values statistically different from zero are in bold. The high 74% of agree-
ment on teenagers being primarily responsible for taking the baby to the health
clinic is qualified that in 8% of families the grandmother has been recognized as
playing a role, too.
N=152 
Decision
Agreement 
Teen
Agreement 
Grandma
Agreement 
Another Disagreement
% of families in which both 
teen & gmma were reported 
as important by both but 
had disagreed on principal 
importance
% of families in which 
both teen & gmma were 
reported as important by 
both & had agreed on 
principle importance
Takes the baby to daycare* 38% 13% 6% 44% 25% 75%
Decides if the baby needs to go 
to daycare* 44% 13% 0% 44% 0% 31%
Takes the baby to the health 
clinic 74% 14% 0% 13% 3% 8%
Decides if the baby needs to go 
to the health clinic 22% 30% 1% 46% 1% 3%
Goes to the store to buy clothes 
& products for the baby 39% 14% 5% 43% 0% 1%
Decides that the baby needs 
clothes 32% 22% 2% 43% 3% 3%
Decides that the grandmother 
needs clothes & products 2% 75% 0% 23% 0% 0%
Pays for the grandmother's 
clothes & products 0% 72% 7% 22% 0% 0%
Decides the teen mother needs 
clothes & products 52% 9% 1% 38% 5% 6%
Pays for the teen mother's 
clothes & products 9% 32% 21% 39% 7% 0%
Decides if the adolescent can 
go out without the baby 5% 61% 0% 34% 0% 0%
Decides if the grandmother can 
go out without the baby 0% 95% 0% 5% 0% 0%
* N = 15 since not all families have day care
Who Is Principally Responsible?
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Table 3.6: Opinions of Self and Other. These questions about opinion of self
and other were asked in separate rooms. For the first two questions, 5 is “very
satisfied” and 1 “not stratified at all.” Both teenagers and grandmothers think
more highly of grandmothers’ parenting skills than the parenting skills of teens,
though teenagers think a little higher of their own skills than the grandmother
thinks of them. The last chart again has 5 as “yes, strongly agree” and 1 “no, not
at all.” With many answers of 5, these families are quite close knit.
Evaluation of teen's child care skills: 
how satisfied are you with the care the 
teen has for the baby? (n=150) Teen's Opinon
1 2 3 4 5
1 0% 1% 1% 3% 3% 7%
2 1% 1% 1% 3% 5% 11%
3 0% 1% 1% 5% 9% 16%
4 0% 0% 3% 2% 11% 16%
5 0% 1% 3% 6% 39% 49%
1% 3% 9% 19% 67% 100%
Evaluation of grandma's child care 
skills: how satisfied are you with the 
care the Grandmother has for the baby? 
(n=150) Teen's Opinon
1 2 3 4 5
1 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1%
2 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3%
4 0% 1% 1% 1% 9% 11%
5 3% 3% 1% 4% 73% 84%
3% 3% 3% 6% 85% 100%
Do they like each other: would you still 
like to live with the other if you were a 
millionaire? (n=150) How Much Teen Likes Grandma
1 2 3 4 5
1 4% 2% 0% 0% 9% 15%
2 1% 1% 1% 0% 3% 5%
3 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 5%
4 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 4%
5 7% 1% 5% 5% 54% 71%
11% 4% 7% 5% 73% 100%
How 
Much
Grandma
Likes 
Teen
Grandma's
Opinion
Grandma's
Opinion
tality, although here there is only one sphere, the infant, with both claiming it as
her own. Table 3.6 supports this, with teenagers claiming much more respon-
sibility for baby than grandmother, even though they spend almost the same
amount of time with the baby.
Table 3.6 also reveals information about attitudes toward self and the other.
On average, both teenager and grandmother indicate they have a higher regard
for the grandmother’s capacity in caring for the child. Yet while teens spend
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slightly more time with the child than grandmothers (14.56 waking hours as op-
posed to the grandmother’s 10.35 waking hours, statistically different at 99%),
the teenagers claim many more of these hours as hours that they are principally
responsible for the baby. Grandmothers claimed 5.48 hours while teenagers
claimed 13.69 hours (also statistically different at 99%). If grandmothers have a
comparative advantage as well as an absolute advantage in child care, the allo-
cation of who cares for the child may be inefficient. This concern is ameliorated
by the finding that in more than half the families both members would like to
live together even when very rich; we do not rule out cooperation as a model.
3.5.1 Results of the Trust Game
We now turn to the experimental results. The trust game is a test of efficiency
within the family. Table 3.7 checks for balance of the two randomized groups A
and B for the first experiment: grandmother owner of the hat first and teenager
owner of the hat first. For the most part we have very close alignment, except
that treatment A has older grandmothers.23
The test of comprehension also suggests that the second time the game is
played the individual is more likely to understand. Even though the instruc-
tions were not repeated after playing the 1st round and were written clearly
(available upon request), I postulate that the first time the game is played there
may be some doubt as to whether the game will indeed be repeated with a
new owner of the hat, or if ownership is randomized and the game only played
once. Therefore the individual holds out a little bit of the contribution, just in
23Three families are not included as there was a discrepancy about which treatment they were
in.
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Table 3.7: Balance in the Trust Game. This table checks for balance between
the two treatments, Teenager or Grandmother owner of the hat first. Most of
the table is the summary statistics, but the last four rows are outcomes. The
misunderstanding teenagers and grandmothers are balanced across treatments.
On average the teenagers placed a slightly higher amount (only .15 cents) in the
hat when it went first to the grandmother, perhaps due to the doubt that they
may be receiving the contents in the first round. Grandmothers did not seem to
have had this misunderstanding.
Treatment A Treatment B P value
Owner of the hat first
Teen Grandmother
N 71 78
Age of teenage mother 17.74 17.74 0.668
Age of teenage mother when 1st child was born 16.19 16.57 0.136
Age of grandmother 46.32 43.59 0.022
Age of grandmother when 1st child was born                     19.35 18.62 0.256
Percentage of households with unwed teens 65% 74% 0.206
Percentage of households with unwed grandmothers 52% 63% 0.189
Percentage of households with the grandmother as household head 70% 74% 0.472
Household size 6.38 6.31 0.839
Percentage of families that own their own home 75% 79% 0.485
Percentage of families with debt 79% 76% 0.675
Value of annual income 9374 9093 0.793
Value of annual consumption 10740 10099 0.453
Per capita annual consumption 1820 1800 0.906
Assets Value (TV, radio, friges, cell phones, car, etc. - not house)) 1241 1040 0.303
Percentage of the families who don't receive Bolsa Familia 39% 43% 0.724
Religious distribustion of the teen mothers
42% Catholic    
12% evangelical           
43% no religion
42% Catholic    
15% evangelical               
42% no religion
.995             
.638       
.747
Religious distribustion of the grandmothers
63% Catholic    
25% evangelical           
11% no religion
58% Catholic    
21% evangelical           
16% no religion
.585               
.612     
.348
Race distribution of the teens
20%  black          
52%  brown          
1% white            
25% pardo            
1% yellow
16%  black          
46%  brown          
5% white            
32% pardo            
0% yellow
.632       
.471            
.211          
.371        
.296
Race distribution of the grandmothers
32%  black          
35%  brown          
3% white            
27% pardo            
3% yellow
28%  black          
41%  brown          
5% white            
22% pardo            
4% yellow
.581        
.469      
.477       
.483       
.730
% of Teens who did not understand 14.08% 14.10% 0.997
% of Grandmothers who did not understand 16.90% 14.10% 0.639
Teen's Contribution to Grandmother contingent on understanding 2.14 (.52) 2.29 (.37) 0.059
Grandmother's contribution to Teen contingent on understanding 2.22 (.41) 2.14 (.61) 0.354
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case hat ownership goes to the other person. (Table 3.7 indicates this confu-
sion may have held for teens. Their average contribution was higher when the
grandmother owned the hat first, perhaps due to the doubt that they may be re-
ceiving it.) But the owner of the hat in the second round knows for sure that the
contents of the hat will be her own and confidently places all into the hat; those
who owned the hat and placed less than R$2.50 in it in the second round clearly
did not understand. Likewise, we also know an individual did not understand
if her contribution to other in the second activity was larger than contribution to
self in 1st activity. There were nineteen teenage mothers and twenty-two grand-
mothers whose behavior matched this criteria, and a total of thirty-nine families
could not be included in the analysis of family bargaining due to at least one of
the members not comprehending the activity (17 families from Treatment A and
18 families from Treatment B).24 If families are already operating in a Pareto Op-
timal manner, the doubt about randomization would not affect their outcome
at all. There were forty-four families who maximized family income. We shall
consider the other forty-five families to be non-Pareto Optimal. On average, I
reject Pareto Optimality as a characteristic of the population as a whole since the
sum of contributions made by the teenager and grandmother are significantly
less than 5 (mean 4.34, s.dev. .057, p-value .000).
24One of my enumerators had been a teacher and was very good at commanding attention,
yet even then, people were still not comprehending. I postulate several causes to this ”just not
getting it”. One is that these types of games are completely foreign. Even though we explained
it clearly and practiced with them, the information did not sink in and they were not able to
make the small connection from the practice to actually playing. This might be due to cogni-
tive ability, lack of familiarity with numbers and money. I tested to see if grandmothers who
didn’t understand were correlated with those who didn’t have jobs, and if teenagers who didn’t
understand were correlated with those who no longer attended school, but these did not come
out significant. These sorts of challenges with comprehension and money could have serious
implications. Credit seems to be easy to acquire in Brazil, mostly for consumable goods. Most
department stores offer their own credit cards. Most stores allow for payments to credit cards
to be divided over four months. It seems as all these “benefits” creep up on the beneficiaries
and they end up with more than they can handle. I checked to see if having the grandmother
as household head is correlated with those who have debt. Surprisingly it came out exactly the
other way: female household head is correlated with not having debt: -.189 (p-value .036).
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Table 3.8: Distribution of Contributions to the Other. 55% of understanding
families exhibited Pareto Optimal behavior in the trust game. The other families
were also generous with few low valued contributions. No one contributed
zero.
Contributions by Grandmother
Matches of contributions by % of 
families who understood N=110  $                 0.50  $                   1.00 1.50$              2.00$              2.50$              
 $             0.50 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
 $             1.00 0% 1% 1% 0% 2% 4%
Contribution by Teen Mother  $             1.50 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 9%
 $             2.00 1% 2% 3% 3% 9% 17%
 $             2.50 0% 2% 5% 7% 56% 70%
1% 5% 10% 13% 71% 100%
To better understand how non-Pareto optimal families behaved, look at Ta-
ble 3.8 to see the distribution of pairs of gifts. It is interesting to note that not
a single person kept all to herself; there was always a contribution. In most
cases, this tended toward R$2.50 rather than zero, consistent with our reports
of families who generally seem to like each other but don’t necessarily take re-
sponsibility together. This would suggest the non-cooperative games have a
public good element to them, or some sort of altruism.
3.5.2 Results from the Bargaining Game
This game does not have a built-in check about whether people understood or
not, though our overall impression was that this game was easier since going to
a store is more intuitive. One family clearly did not understand as they reported
valuations of R$.50, but were supposed to only use whole numbers. They are
excluded from the analysis. The other doubt is that some may have fixated on
the possibility of winning the book for free, though we tried to emphasize that
if they put down zero as their valuation, the probability of getting the book was
slim. While 40 of 300 individuals selected a valuation of zero, of these, only two
of these were in the group that did not understand the first game. Any error,
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Table 3.9: Balance in the Bargaining Game.
Treatment C Treatment D Treatment E Treatment F
Joint Valuation done First X X endowment joint first
Endowment goes to Teen Mother X X variation variation
N 53 59 20 16 CE vs DF CD vs EF
Age of teenage mother 17.77 17.75 17.43 17.75 0.644 0.614
Age of teenage mother when 1st child was born 16.61 16.27 16.05 16.4 0.670 0.527
Age of grandmother 45.08 44.39 45.03 45.79 0.855 0.579
Age of grandmother when 1st child was born                     19.35 18.71 19.5 18 0.359 0.942
Age of child 1.18 1.49 1.39 1.35 0.318 0.885
Sex of child (% female) 39% 39% 45% 41% 0.922 0.433
Percentage of households with unwed teens 42% 68% 65% 76% 0.829 0.826
Percentage of households with unwed grandmothers 52% 61% 50% 71% 0.163 0.596
Percentage of households with the grandmother as hh head 78% 75% 55% 63% 0.901 0.041
Household size 6.43 6.29 6.5 6.35 0.704 0.792
Percentage of families that own their own home 78% 81% 55% 82% 0.298 0.106
Percentage of families with debt             81% 71% 85% 76% 0.213 0.431
Value of annual income 8820 8926 10901 9771 0.481 0.271
Value of annual consumption 10544 10256 11612 9227 0.665 0.827
Per capita annual consumption 1795 1832 1977 1551 0.862 0.167
Assets Value (TV, radio, friges, cell phones, car, etc. - not house)) 1283 1149 953 820 0.796 0.131
Percentage of the families who don't receive Bolsa Familia 46% 39% 25% 47% 0.862 0.476
Religious distribustion of the teen mothers                                      
(Catholic, evangelical, no religion)
46% Catholic      
13% evangelical           
40% no religion
37% Catholic    
17% evangelical           
44% no religion
30% Catholic    
15% evangelical           
55% no religion
59% Catholic      
6% evangelical           
25% no religion
.944               
.968               
.799
.622           
.458              
.904   
Religious distribustion of the grandmothers                                         
(Catholic, evangelical, no religion)
59% Catholic    
26% evangelical           
15% no religion
63% Catholic    
29% evangelical           
8% no religion
55% Catholic    
10% evangelical           
25% no religion
70% Catholic    
11% evangelical           
17% no religion
.296                
.757                
.173
.738               
.028               
.162
Race distribution of the teens                                                                
(black, brown, white, pardo, yellow) 
13%  black          
52%  brown          
6% white            
27% pardo            
2% yellow
24%  black          
49%  brown          
2% white            
25% pardo            
0% yellow
20%  black          
45%  brown          
0% white            
35% pardo            
0% yellow
12%  black          
47%  brown          
6% white            
35% pardo            
0% yellow
.229               
.638                
.589              
.630               
.338   
.793               
.464               
.770              
.421                  
.559
Race distribution of the grandmothers                                                       
(black, brown, white, pardo, yellow) 
31%  black          
35%  brown          
6% white            
24% pardo            
4% yellow
37%  black          
34%  brown          
5% white            
20% pardo            
3% yellow
15%  black          
50%  brown          
0% white            
30% pardo            
5% yellow
18%  black          
47%  brown          
0% white            
35% pardo            
0% yellow
 .229                     
.589                
.922               
.780                
.717
 .793                      
.198                 
.144                  
.165               
.770
then, by consistent misunderstanding is likely small.
I found no significant interaction terms between treatments, nor are the in-
teraction terms jointly significant, so I analyze each variation separately. Pooling
treatments C and D and comparing them to pooled treatments E and F allow for
a test in an effect in the order of valuations. Pooling treatments C and E compar-
ing them to treatments D and F tests if valuations change when the endowment
changes. In Table 3.9 we find our sub-samples well balanced.
Table 3.10 reports the average valuations for each individual within each
treatment and Table 3.11 tests for significant differences across our two varia-
tions by including interaction terms. In addition to examining the behavior of
the entire sample, I examine the behavior of the Pareto efficient families and the
non-Pareto efficient families who understood the trust game. Since our games
are testing different facets of the same models, we may expect there to be some
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Table 3.10: Valuations in Brazilian Reais. Average valuations by treatment and
individual. Standard deviations in parentheses. All values are quite close. Table
3.11 tests for significant differences between the valuations.
R$1~US$0.50
Treatment 
C
Treatment 
D
Treatment 
E
Treatment 
F
Joint Valuation done First X X
Endowment goes to Teen Mother X X
N 53 59 20 16
Teen Mother's Valuation
3.42 
(.359)
3.60 
(.335)
3.90 
(.512)
3.06 
(.680)
Grandmother's Valuation
3.13 
(.329)
3.33 
(.348)
3.20 
(.474)
3.69 
(.783)
Joint Valuation
3.41 
(.376)
3.87 
(.393)
4.00 
(.508)
3.06 
(.655)
sort of difference in the way the two groups behave. Likewise family and indi-
vidual characteristics should be influencing valuations through both the sharing
rule and individual utility, but I find these not to be significant and do not report
them with the findings.
The top boxes of Table 3.11 do not indicate significant changes caused by
switching the endowment from one person to the other, meaning these data do
not reject the unitary model. Likewise in the boxes below there are no significant
changes in valuations caused by eliciting the joint valuation first rather than
second. We conclude that on average the short time span between writing the
individual and joint valuation does not change valuations very much, if at all.
What we do, see, though, is including dummy terms for behavior in the trust
game does yield a significant difference in the valuations of the Pareto efficient
families from the non-efficient families while the non-understanding families
do not. Valuations in Pareto efficient families were, on average, R$1.25 lower.
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Table 3.11: Bargaining Results. The top chart uses as the base case the
teenager’s valuation when the grandmother has the endowment. In the top left
regression we have the entire sample considered. The coefficient corresponding
to GmmaVal tells us that on average the grandmother values the book slightly
less than the teenager, all else constant. Likewise we find the JointVal(uation)
also slightly lower but neither is significant. The test for bargaining is found
from the coefficient TeenEnd(owment), and its interaction terms: GVTE is Tee-
nEnd interacted with GmmaVal and JVTE is TeenEnd interacted with JointVal.
None of these are statistically significant, indicating that the change in endow-
ment affects results little, if at all. Another specification to the right includes
dummy variables indicating the family’s behavior in the trust game. Members
of Pareto optimal families place significantly lower valuations than non-Pareto
efficient families. The same results hold when examining the other permuta-
tions of the regression corresponding to the other base cases. The bottom chart
pools the same data in a different way, examining if the order in which the valu-
ations are solicited causes any change. Again, no statistically significant results
are found for the entire sample, except for the same outcome with Pareto opti-
mal families.
Varying endowment ownership
Number of obs 444 Number of obs 444
F( 5, 438) 0.370 F( 7, 436) 3.41
Prob > F 0.871 Prob > F 0.002
R-squared 0.004 R-squared 0.052
Adj R-squared -0.007 Adj R-squared 0.037
Root MSE 2.623 Root MSE 2.565
Dependent
Variable Val Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std. Dev. P>t
GmmaVal -0.301 0.434 0.488 -0.301 0.425 0.478
TeenVal 0.068 0.434 0.875 0.068 0.425 0.872
TeenEnd 0.267 0.431 0.536 0.238 0.422 0.573
GVTE -0.005 0.610 0.993 -0.005 0.596 0.993
TVTE -0.282 0.610 0.644 -0.282 0.596 0.637
constant 3.479 0.307 0.000 4.073 0.349 0.000
PO -1.251 0.286 0.000
notund -0.239 0.319 0.454
Varying order of valuation
Number of obs 444 Number of obs 444
F( 5, 438) 0.320 F( 7, 436) 3.420
Prob > F 0.899 Prob > F 0.001
R-squared 0.004 R-squared 0.052
Adj R-squared -0.008 Adj R-squared 0.037
Root MSE 2.623 Root MSE 2.565
Dependent
Variable Val Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std. Dev. P>t
GmmaVal -0.429 0.351 0.222 -0.429 0.343 0.212
TeenVal -0.143 0.351 0.684 -0.143 0.343 0.677
Joint1st -0.299 0.503 0.553 -0.385 0.495 0.436
GVJ1 0.512 0.711 0.472 0.512 0.695 0.462
TVJ1 0.282 0.711 0.692 0.282 0.695 0.685
constant 3.688 0.248 0.000 4.283 0.296 0.000
PO -1.254 0.286 0.000
notund -0.217 0.324 0.505
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Table 3.12: Test of Treatment Effects. I divide the population into three sub-
sets to see if bargaining behavior varies according to type of behavior in the
trust game. The Pareto efficient and non-understanding families exhibited uni-
tary behavior, but we discover that non-Pareto Efficient families exhibit some
evidence of bargaining, as changing the endowment causes significantly differ-
ences for the joint valuation, the base case used. This evidence is weak, however,
due to the high p value on the t and f statistics. In other permutations of the en-
dowment variation, the grandmother’s valuation is lower when compared to
base case JointVal-TeenEnd (coef= -1.16 std.dev.=699 pval=0.099.) We find this
same significance for the grandmother’s valuation when varying the order of
valuation, as well as finding that when the joint valuation is first, the valuations
are lower than when the joint valuation is second.
Varying endowment ownership
Pareto obs 183 Non obs 144 Families obs 117
Efficient F( 5, 177) 0.200 Pareto F( 5, 138) 1.500 that didn't F( 5, 111) 1.070
Families Prob > F 0.963 Efficient Prob > F 0.193 understand Prob > F 0.379
R-squared 0.006 Families R-squared 0.052 R-squared 0.046
squared -0.023 squared 0.017 squared 0.003
Root MSE 2.713 Root MSE 2.472 Root MSE 2.418
Dependent 
Variable Val Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std. Dev. P>t
GmmaVal 0.000 0.689 1.000 -0.565 0.729 0.439 -0.474 0.785 0.547
TeenVal -0.161 0.689 0.815 0.217 0.729 0.766 0.263 0.785 0.738
TeenEnd 0.090 0.695 0.897 1.217 0.714 0.091 -0.768 0.775 0.323
GVTE 0.367 0.982 0.709 -0.595 1.010 0.557 0.224 1.096 0.839
TVTE 0.328 0.982 0.739 -0.737 1.010 0.467 -0.663 1.096 0.546
constant 2.710 0.487 0.000 3.783 0.515 0.000 4.368 0.555 0.000
Varying order of valuation
Pareto obs 183 Non obs 144 Families obs 117
Efficient F( 5,   177) 0.360 Pareto F( 5, 138) 2.260 that didn't F( 5, 111) 0.130
Families Prob > F 0.878 Efficient Prob > F 0.052 understand Prob > F 0.986
R-squared 0.010 Families R-squared 0.076 R-squared 0.006
squared -0.018 squared 0.042 squared -0.039
Root MSE 2.707 Root MSE 2.441 Root MSE 2.469
Dependent 
Variable Val Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std. Dev. P>t Coef. Std.Dev. P>t
GmmaVal 0.224 0.547 0.682 -1.205 0.553 0.031 -0.500 0.713 0.484
TeenVal -0.041 0.547 0.941 -0.205 0.553 0.711 -0.250 0.713 0.726
Joint1st 0.617 0.872 0.480 -1.880 0.903 0.039 -0.283 0.813 0.728
GVJ1 -0.224 1.233 0.856 1.761 1.276 0.170 0.367 1.149 0.750
TVJ1 0.207 1.233 0.867 0.205 1.276 0.873 0.450 1.149 0.696
constant 2.633 0.387 0.000 4.769 0.391 0.000 4.083 0.504 0.000
Exploring this finding further, I divide the population into the Pareto ef-
ficient, non-Pareto efficient, and non-understanding families. Repeating the
same tests looking for evidence of bargaining and any influence caused by the
order of the valuations, we find evidence of both amongst the non-Pareto effi-
cient group; valuations are higher when the teen has the endowment, and lower
when the joint valuation is done first. The non-Pareto efficient group indicates
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some differences when the variation in order of valuations is considered. Pre-
sented in Table 3.12, base case JointVal-GmmaEnd reveals a suggestion of bar-
gaining: all valuations are about one Brazilian real (50 cents) higher when the
teen owns the endowment. This is particularly curious because from our theo-
retical discussion we expect teens to place a lower value on the item when they
have the endowment, as the sharing rule is likely in their favor. Also signifi-
cant in addition to those in the table are variables Joint1st and GmmaVal when
comparing to base case TeenVal-Joint2nd (coefficients -1.675 and -1.000 and p-
values .066 and .073 respectively). Though there are no significant differences
found between the teen and joint valuations, when the joint valuation is done
second, the grandmother’s valuation is different. This implies some dictatorial
power to the teen in this case, but when the joint valuation is done first, we
cannot conclude this. We also find that the teen and joint valuations are higher
when the joint valuations are done second, and lower when done first. The
grandmother’s valuation is relatively constant over this source of variation.
These regressions also examine the second question posed in this game: does
either group, teenagers or grandmothers, “spend more” on the infant on aver-
age. We are interested to see how the population valued the counting book and
if the valuations of teenagers or their mothers are higher, as an indication of who
may pay more for the baby’s well-being. The regressions indicate that only in
non Pareto efficient families may grandmothers value the book a bit less. How-
ever, I found no family characteristics which correlate with Pareto Optimality
or not. Without such information it would be very difficult to develop a pol-
icy only for non-Pareto optimal families, so I conclude there is no evidence in
support of targeting transfers.
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In addition to exploring statistical outcomes for the population as a whole,
the data does allow us to categorize some families’ individual behavior. I cat-
egorize families as consensus unitary if all the valuations (teenager’s, grand-
mother’s and joint) are the same. They are dictator families if the higher val-
uation is the same as the joint valuation, (though only if this person is not the
owner of the endowment,) and bargaining families if their joint valuation falls
within the two valuations (though even if the joint valuation falls below the two
individual ones it has potential to be cooperative bargaining). There is much
behavior that remains uncategorizeable, however. In many families joint valu-
ations were above the individual valuations rather than below, suggesting that
individuals together valued the good higher. Perhaps this is due to a public
goods effect, where individually the value is not seen as high, but when they
come together they realize this product deserves a larger investment. This con-
clusion does not hold for all families, though. Of the families where an individ-
ual valuation was equal to the joint, 46 families went with the higher number
when deciding jointly, and 45 chose the lower number. In families with an inter-
mediate valuation as the joint valuation, the joint valuation tended toward the
lower number.
At this point we shall examine how the behavior of individual families in the
trust game aligned with that in the bargaining, and if these fall into any patterns
as predicted by the household models. We would expect dictator families and
consensus families to have Pareto Optimal behavior, while the bargained cases
may or may not. What is most surprising is that we are only able to classify just
more than half of the understanding families into standard models. The others
defy the predictions of the models while we are unable to draw conclusions
regarding a final 39 due to their lack of understanding of the trust game.
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Table 3.13: Bargaining Behavior by Behavior in the Trust Game. The outcome
of the trust game finalizes the categorization of bargaining behavior. The blue
are unitary, the red are cooperative bargaining, while purple may be either, ac-
cording to the theoretical predictions. The green is non-cooperative bargaining.
What is most striking is the number of families that don’t behave according to
the predictions in the models. In total of the 110 understanding families, there
are 11% unitary, 11% cooperative bargainers, and another 25% that are either
unitary or cooperative, 6% non-cooperative, and 47% that defy categorization
into standard models and 39 families that defy categorization due to not under-
standing.
% of families in each cateogry of  Trust 
Game results according to behavior in 
the Book Game
PO    
families
non-PO 
families
not und. 
Families
Family Types                                      N 61 48 39
Consensus families 8% 4% 3%
Joint <both individual valuations 10% 8% 15%
Joint=teen=lowest individual valuation 15% 4% 8%
Joint=grandma=lowest individual valuation 18% 17% 8%
Joint between individual valuations 10% 13% 26%
Joint=teen=highest individual valuation 7%, 5% 21% 15%
Joint=grandma=highest individual valuation 5%, 8% 10% 3%
Joint>both individual valuations 15% 23% 23%
The subset of 
"understanding" families
3.6 Discussion
In face of a challenging endogeneity problem, the novel coupling of two eco-
nomic games has given us some important insights about the relationship be-
tween teen mothers and their mothers. The population has minimal expen-
diture on private goods, and unearned sources of income are also shown to be
endogenous. Without these key variables, standard econometric analysis is next
to impossible. Fortunately experimental economic techniques allow for innova-
tions that permit findings otherwise unattainable.
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First, we have strong indication that behavior in one game is related to be-
havior in the other, confirming that the games test two aspects of the the same
question. A family with a Pareto efficient outcome in the trust game has lower
valuations in the book game. Furthermore, different patterns of valuations arise
when the book game valuations are grouped by outcome of the trust game.
On average, non-Pareto efficient families showed some evidence of bargaining
and of valuations shifting over time. Theory would suggest harmonious and
non-cooperative bargaining models for the Pareto and non-Pareto subsets of
the population respectively. There is less to say about the non-understanding
group since we cannot categorize them due to the lack of credible data in the
trust game. Like Pareto efficient families, on average they do not exhibit varia-
tions in valuations, but they value the baby book higher than efficient families.
However, when we disaggregate the families to examine them individually,
most do not align with standard models. Many families with “dictatorial” be-
havior in the book game do not have the Pareto optimal outcome predicted by a
unitary model. A few Pareto efficient families arrive at a higher joint valuation
than either of the individual valuations, a theoretic impossibility (at least in the
models we explored).
These anomalies suggest that this population of teen mothers and their
mothers require a different model of interaction than those typically applied
in standard literature. These data offer fodder for future modeling endeavors.
The statistics from the sociological questions give us a glimpse as to what ele-
ments must be present. In an average household, the teen is designated as the
principal caretaker of the baby, yet the grandmother has overarching control of
domestic matters. Though this scenario sounds like the rotten kid theorem, the
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ability to conceal actions within domains implies that non-Pareto efficient out-
comes are feasible, even within a dictatorial framework. I further hypothesize
that if a teen wished to convince her mother that she was not engaging in sur-
reptitious activity, she may over-act in accordance with her mother’s wishes in
the presence of her mother, as not to arouse suspicion. And perhaps her mother
is doing the same. This is one explanation for why non-Pareto efficient families
have higher valuations for the counting book. More theoretical work on par-
ents and children will be helpful for providing further interpretations of these
findings.
We have noted the high prevalence of teenage mothers in Brazil and the ten-
dency for them to continue to live in their mothers’ homes. These families are
a vulnerable population with the children at risk for continuing in the cycle of
poverty. I find no evidence that teens will spend more or less on the child’s wel-
fare than the grandmothers would, with welfare proxied as the valuation of the
children’s book. Thus no change in the targeting of Bolsa Familia’s cash trans-
fers is supported, a heartening result due to the problematic incentive impli-
cations of paying teen mothers. Yet most individuals agree that grandmothers
are better care-givers, but that the child is principally the teen’s responsibility.
While this may align with the family’s needs and comparative advantages, it
may not be in the baby’s best interests. Educational parenting interventions
would be worth considering. The Pastoral already provides some, but once a
month is not sufficient. Further research can be done to determine how best to
address the needs of these young women, their children, and their families.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: A CASE STUDY
This paper stems from some dissatisfaction I experienced during my disser-
tation fieldwork regarding my lack of preparation in qualitative practices, some
of which would have been quite helpful even in the quantitative analysis I ap-
plied. In the first section I make a case for including more qualitative analysis
within economics research and curriculum, and in the second section I draw
on quantitative and qualitative analysis to develop comprehensive policy that
would assist my population of interest in the field work: teen mothers who
live with their mothers in Salvador, Brazil. This wider perspective allows for a
broader understanding of the lives of these families as well as better-informed
policy suggestions.
4.1 The Case for Integration
The social sciences have long entertained a dialogue about qualitative and quan-
titative research and its ability to cross disciplines. Since the beginning of the
20th century, the social science interdisciplinary movement finds roots in area
studies, uniting experts in many different fields around a geographic area (Klein
1990, pg 25). Yet in spite of these common interests, a philosophical discussion
of epistemology suggests a natural divide between the qualitative and quanti-
tative approaches. With fundamental assumptions differing regarding human
nature, epistemology adapts to each side of the dichotomy: in one view reality
is concrete and man a responder, and in the other, reality is a created projection
with man as the social constructor. A lack of precision will not be acceptable for
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he who holds the first view, while he who holds the second will reject the first’s
conclusions: “the knowledge thus created is often no more than an expression
of the manner in which the scientist as a human being has arbitrarily imposed
a personal frame of reference on the world” (Morgan and Smirich 1980 pg 493).
Morgan and Smirich note that this difference in epistemology does not have to
imply a difference in techniques, at least not for objectivists adapting subjec-
tivist procedures. Coding responses to open-ended questions captures this idea
well. This is an easy reconciliation, but the qualitative technique is still used
from within in a quantitative mindset, hardly qualifying it as qualitative.
The case for approaching a subject from both directions is strengthened
when we leave dichotomous “either-or” thinking and appropriate “both-and.”
The differences in mindsets may be akin to the difference between the two Span-
ish words for “to know.” Saber indicates a mental knowledge, while conocer
suggests familiarity with the object. I reject the dichotomy, for one can saber
and conocer at the same time; there are many scientific facts to acquire about
the ocean, but splashing in it gives an entirely different sense of understand-
ing, one which can be complementary. Bardhan and Ray (2006) better classify
the distinction of these mindsets from within social science. They highlight the
mindset of an economist as one who sees people as autonomous, focuses on
outcomes, and delights in parsimony, while anthropologists view humans as
embedded within society, explores processes, and appreciates complexity.
While these differing viewpoints may explain differences in disciplines, few
claim that reality is one or the other; Bourguignon describes them as two sides
of the same mountain (in Kanbur, 2001 pg 44). Within academia, concerted ef-
forts abound to use complementary perspectives on an individual topic. Cornell
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boasts over a hundred interdisciplinary centers. In Toronto, there is even an in-
terdisciplinary center devoted to studying interdisciplinary (poverty) studies:
the Q-squared project.
These movements imply that epistemological and methodological gaps are
ones that can be crossed and are ones that researchers are interested in cross-
ing. Notes from the first Q-squared conference on integrating the methods in
poverty alleviation provide useful commentary. The dichotomies presented by
Kanbur as those that characterize the divide between quantitative and qualita-
tive perspectives are more varied than Bardhan and Ray’s division of funda-
mental perspectives:
1. Type of information on population: numerical to non-numerical
2. Type of population coverage: specific to general
3. Type of population involvement: active to passive
4. Type of inference methodology: inductive to deductive
5. Type of disciplinary framework: broad social sciences to neo-classical
economics
The first three emphasize which techniques are chosen, while the last two
consider the underlying assumptions. In the conference, most agreed that
movement and progress toward integration could be achieved on points one,
two, and somewhat three. Points four and five were not seen as easy to inte-
grate, as in Bardhan and Ray’s philosophical discussion. 1 Yet though the ap-
1These categories are not specific to poverty studies, but as the conference discussion centers
around them and my topic is also is in the subfield of economic development, I shall continue
with examples from these disciplines.
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proaches may be mutually exclusive within a specific task, the research process
does not have to exclude one in favor of the other. Inductive, more anthropo-
logical methods used to formulate questions and theories, can later be tested
through economic modeling and large-scale projects (Barrett in Kanbur 2001).
The formulation of the numeric surveys contains qualitative aspects in creating
questions and deciding which to include. Once the survey is complete, outliers
can be identified and explained through qualitative means (Rao 2002).
Much research in development economics already follows this protocol, per-
haps precisely because of this movement. In this past year’s development eco-
nomics seminars at UC Berkeley, economists have reported using a variety of
qualitative methods. They have quantified typically qualitative data: Eva Vi-
valt (UC Berkeley PhD Candidate) coded political variables to explore the effec-
tiveness of UN peacekeeping forces and Jonas Hjort (UC Berkeley PhD Candi-
date) included a values questionnaire in a survey on intra-household allocation.
Owen Ozier (UC Berkeley PhD Candidate) cited anthropological evidence for
exploring social risk taking in Kenya. Qualitative analysis even stood alone
to support quantitative analysis: Ray Fisman discussed detailed history of the
structure of Chinese firms (Columbia), and Erica Field incorporated analysis
from focus groups in her analysis of health interventions (Harvard).
In spite of these tendencies, the economic development literature lacks dis-
cussion within economics about how to go about this kind of work systemati-
cally. The case has been made for it and clearly qualitative techniques are seep-
ing into the work of top economists, but without an accompanying discussion
of methodology that often accompanies the adaptation of new techniques.
As the field of economics has evolved with the adoption of new methods,
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handbooks have been written to assist application. Advances in computing and
statistical methods have been influential in applied economics and economet-
rics. Thus we consult the Stata manual and econometrics textbooks. Random-
ization has become a cornerstone of New Empirical Development Economics;
“Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit” is re-
quired reading in many classes (Duflo, Glennerster, Kremmer 2006). Behavioral
economics has tested economic premises using the techniques of psychological
experiments and network theory has provided new methods of modeling. In
designing my project, I consulted Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists
(Friedman and Sunder 1994). The North Holland publishing company has a
handbook series for economists spanning many different topics.
Yet in spite of the incorporation of qualitative techniques into development
research, we do not find these handbooks for economists. The closest I came
in my search for such a book was an article from 1979: “Qualitative Research
Techniques in Economics” which is more a justification of open ended inter-
views than a didactic tool (Piore). A much shorter gem from the AER by Su-
san Helper provides some sound advice, albeit three pages is hardly a hand-
book. Building on Piore, Helper offers suggestions for doing field work with
an economic mindset (but not quantitative), as opposed to an anthropological
one: “Economists often go into the field with hypotheses to test. In contrast,
disciplines like anthropology emphasize understanding the world as their in-
formants do” (2000). She suggests a few ways that interviews can help first
in developing hypothesis: allowing an informant to ramble, even if off topic,
can be a source of alternative theories. They may say something you had not
considered before. Then, once the main hypotheses are established, they can be
tested through “triangulation,” collecting responses that can be crossed checked
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in other interviews, documents, site visits, etc. Finally, a careful write up can im-
ply replicability and improve readers’ confidence in qualitative findings. These
examples show that the epistemological gap between fields need not restrict the
transferability of techniques.
With such a strong case for both qualitative research and its feasibility within
economics, why has its incorporation into the mainstream lagged? Julie Nelson
suggests a values-based justification of quantitative analysis keep the qualita-
tive at bay. While economists at times feel that quantitative data reflect rigor in
that they are “objective” rational choice theory, the preferred analysis applied
by economists, has sacrificed complexity to the ideals of parsimony, simplicity,
and precision. This in itself, however, is a subjective preference for these values
rather than a weighed “objective” choice. She suggests the source of this pref-
erence a historical trend that emphasizes rationality as the distinction between
humans and animals. Economics has not yet embraced the physical and emo-
tional qualities of humans that distinguish them from computers. Incorporating
these into economic analysis would make the discipline more objective rather
than less so. Of course these discussions involve less math, so economists may
feel uncomfortable with learning new techniques and branching into new terri-
tory. While they may not “feel” as rigorous, the objective economist will recog-
nize that this sensation is a value judgement rather than an academic analysis.
(Nelson, 2009).
Fortunately some excellent economists have broken out of the mainstream
framework to tackle complex issues within the qualitative realm. Within the
work of household economics, for example, on the theoretical level we have
Amartya Sen who, in the article “Gender and Cooperative Conflicts,” engages
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in an overarching philosophical qualitative discussion of intra-household bar-
gaining (1987), while on an empirical level, Bina Agarwal’s book A Field of One’s
Own grounds her conclusions in field work in Southeast Asia (1995).2 Sen’s
work uses economic theory as a starting point and analyzes its variables and
structure in light of qualitative research on women around the world. He illus-
trates the directions in which theory must move in order to become more en-
compassing of more lives. Agarwal, on the other hand, starts from experience
and builds a case for land ownership as she shows how this right empowers
women through complex social and economic mechanisms. Both are economic
masterpieces in spite of their lack of quantitative content.
Still, instruction in economics is highly quantitative. In spite of these great
works, the field is more influenced by Milton Friedman’s essay on methodology.
He concludes with the reflection, “the construction of hypotheses is a creative
act of inspiration, intuition, invention; its essence is the vision of something
new in familiar material. The process must be discussed in psychological, not
logical, categories; studied in autobiographies and biographies, not treatises on
scientific method; and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or theo-
rem.” (1966, pg 43). While I have only read this passage recently, it is a familiar
sentiment echoed as words of advice by many professors to graduate students,
and from graduate student to graduate student. This collective belief within
the profession leaves no room for systematic qualitative work that can be the
foundation of a model. Though not everyone has a “knack” for insight, surely
the chasm between information and understanding can be made smaller with
the appropriate organization of the information, facilitated by systematic quali-
2Of course within the realm of feminist thought it is harder to detach theory from empirics,
as they are less distant cousins than within the economic mainstream. Without so many mathe-
matical techniques separating the two, a holistic approach for arriving at and testing theories is
more possible.
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tative research.
Besides hypothesis building, the neglect of these skills brings consequence to
other aspects of research. Without ability to undertake qualitative evaluations,
economists may use perfect techniques to arrive at inaccurate results. Lacking
sufficient training and preparedness, “many surveys that have been undertaken
in developing countries have produced large data sets of doubtful quality and
thus of uncertain usefulness” (Glewwe, 39). Economists must be able to recog-
nize when missing data, unrealistic values, or poorly written questions are of
concern.
While a grasp of these qualitative criteria of evaluation are important for an
economist who works in Stata, an even more comprehensive understanding is
required for those who engage in field work. Take, for example, the develop-
ment of a survey, a key tool for much of economics. Paul Glewwe (Household
Sample Surveys in Developing and Transition Countries UN Handbook) lays
out the process of how a survey is created. From his language it is clear to see
that aspects of survey design are inherently qualitative. The following quotes
suggest the process of survey design includes systematic categorization using
subjective criteria.
• “This process of choosing a reasonable set of objectives is more an art than
a science.” (38)
• “Experience with other surveys recently completed in the same country
should provide a good guide to what is feasible and what is unrealistic.
. . both local experience and international experience are good guides to
achieving that balance.” (40)
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• “Starting the interview with simple questions on non-sensitive topics will
help the interviewer put the household members at ease and develop a
rapport with them.” (42)
• Enumerators’ “previous experience in collecting household survey data is
indispensable. They know best what kinds of questions households can
answer and what kinds they cannot answer.” (47)
The first two quotes suggest some participant observation of the survey pro-
cess itself is required in order to make meaningful judgments. The latter two
require skills at the inter-personal level, an ability to evaluate the relationships
between the enumerators and the households, often people of other cultures.
These themes certainly fall outside the cannon of economic methodology, yet
underpin data gathering. Even so, it is left to the reader to determine how to
achieve these skills on her own. A more pronounced acknowledgement of their
role in the creation of economic knowledge could benefit the field if students
learn these methods explicitly and included them in their final analyses. While
economists may not be as interested in a discussion about word choice in the
survey, they are much less qualified than linguists to be making these decisions,
so precisely for that reason, economists should include this discussion.
Why aren’t qualitative methods incorporated in economics curriculum, if,
as we have seen, they are essential for successful fieldwork? Feminists claim
a masculine bias within the field: “Analytical methods associated with detach-
ment, mathematical reasoning, formality, and abstraction have cultural associa-
tions that are positive and masculine, in contrast with methods associated with
connectedness, verbal reasoning, informality, and concrete detail, which are cul-
turally considered feminine–and inferior” (Nelson, 1996). Likewise, there has
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been a noted preference for quantitative research in policy-making circles, as
numbers exude scientific credibility (Kanbur in Kanbur). Another reason for
this lack of instruction may be the selection bias economists have in choosing
economics in a subject matter in the first place. Because qualitative research is
relatively evolutionary and adaptable, explaining the processes requires narra-
tives. Economists’ comparative advantage is usually math oriented and they
are less comfortable with uncertainty in methods. The laboratory write-up style
is much more familiar, where all plans exist before any action is taken. The
evolving project does not easily fit into this scheme.
One risk of separating the quantitative from the qualitative is that discrep-
ancies can arise between them which economists may ignore if they are focused
only on the quantitative. Vijayendra Rao’s work illustrates this problem. In
an article published in the AER, Francis Bloch and Vijayendra Rao incorporate
ethnographic study as motivation for their model of domestic violence as a bar-
gaining tool in eliciting transfers from a bride’s family to a groom’s in India
(2002). They do not explain their qualitative methodology in the AER, but ref-
erence readers to another piece, which discusses it in detail (Rao 2002). Unfor-
tunately, referees seem not to have read this second work, which holds some
contradictions with the first.
In the qualitative analysis, Rao explains how a key variable had an interpre-
tation issue:
“In studying domestic violence [in India] a question in the survey instrument
asked if female respondents had ever been beaten by their husbands in the
course of their marriage. Only 22 per cent of women responded positively to
this question – a domestic violence rate much lower than studies in Britain and
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the US had shown. In probing the issue with in-depth interviews we discovered
that the women had interpreted the word ’beating’ to mean extremely severe
beating...Responses to a broader version of the abuse question, comparable to
the questions asked in the US and UK surveys, elicited a 70 per cent positive
response.” (1889-1890)
Surprisingly, this measure of domestic violence with occurrence at 22 percent
is precisely the outcome variable he uses in the quantitative AER paper. Bloch
and Rao justify this with the following statement, seeming to contradict his pre-
vious analysis: “The question on the incidence of domestic violence, which was
answered by 137 women, elicited a much more accurate response than the ques-
tions about its extent and severity” (1037). The footnote goes on to explain this
choice as one due to concerns about the enumerators; there is no mention of
the earlier implied embarrassment, shame, or fear as a reason for silence. “The
questions on the extent and severity of violence were answered by only 70 per-
cent of the sample. Even when the questions were answered, the responses
had strong interviewer effects with some interviewers being able to elicit more
complete and consistent responses than others. On the other hand, the dichoto-
mous question on whether a woman had ever been physically assaulted by her
husband was answered by all the respondents without significant interviewer
effects” (1037). To further justify the use of the chosen variable they cite statistics
that do not align with the story he tells in the qualitative paper: “Note that 23
percent of women said that their husbands had beaten them at some time during
the marriage. This proportion is higher than the incidence in the United States,
where one in six women report having been struck by their husbands during
the course of a marriage, but consistent with data from other developing coun-
tries” (1039). An earlier empirical work also undermines this justification; Rao
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engages in a detailed discussion about the same variable under-reporting do-
mestic violence, cautioning the reader when interpreting statistical results (Rao
1998).
This discrepancy in variable interpretation illustrates the necessity of qual-
itative rigor as well as quantitative. To achieve this, economists must commit
to engaging in qualitative discussion. A development of qualitative literature
within the instructional cannon in the long run will ensure that others also have
sufficient food for thought in executing their own projects with cultural aware-
ness and critical standards. Since the case is so strong for qualitative work and
economists recognize the importance of sound methods, quantitative or other-
wise, qualitative case studies can well become protocol in and of themselves. In
an era of computation where data abounds and we are inundated with statistics,
qualitative expertise will help discern which we numbers can actually trust.
4.2 A Case Study
In defiance of my own economic mind-set, which leaves me doubtful of my abil-
ity create knowledge and synthesize experiences in a qualitative setting, here I
incorporate my quantitative results with qualitative analysis in a discussion of
teen mothers who live with their mothers. I documenting the experience of
fieldwork in Salvador, Brazil, from September 2008-June 2009. The quantitative
work, “Intergenerational Intra-household Allocation: Teen Mothers and Their
Mothers in Salvador, Brazil” (Reynolds, 2010), describes the economic vulnera-
bility and family structure of a sample of 152 teen mothers who live with their
mothers and participate in the NGO Pastoral da Crianca. Concerned about in-
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tergenerational poverty transfer to the teens’ children, I attempt to understand
how these families function, so that an intervention may be targeted appropri-
ately. This paper suggests policy that may be developed. In this paper I first
identify four areas of risk for the baby: material, health, developmental, and
psychological. Then I summarize the family power structure, as determined
in the empirical work. Finally, I qualitatively analyze social service agencies
that serve teen mothers in Salvador and discuss how Bolsa Familia can incor-
porate aspects of them to better assist these families. Even though I did not set
forth with the intention of institutional evaluation, my fieldwork experiences
immersed me in the world of the social assistance agencies as through them I
sought connections to teen mothers.
4.2.1 Identifying Risks
Statistics from the survey confirm the vulnerability of this population and illus-
trate the risk of intergenerational poverty transmission as well as health risks.
The data on these households indicate that they face many more economic chal-
lenges than the average Brazilian family (See table Descriptive Statistics). The
children also face health risks more than the average family served by the Pas-
toral da Crianca. Within the 2nd and 3rd regions of Salvador 5% of children
had diarrhea in the last month, as reported by their mothers. In this popula-
tion of only teen mothers, we had 35.5%. 3 4 The World Health Organization
recommends that babies not be weaned until two years and breast fed exclu-
3The age of the baby is positively correlated with diarrhea reporting (.24 at 99%), implying
that these numbers are probably not skewed by new mothers incorrectly identifying infant feces
as diarrhea.
4All statistics in this paragraph calculated from my data are significantly different from the
comparison reference with 99% confidence.
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sively for six months. Of the 114 children under two years of age, only 67.5%
are still breastfed. Of the 47 infants in my sample six months or younger, 31.9%
are exclusively breastfeed and of the 41 infants four months or younger, 34.1%
are exclusively breastfed. 5 Finally, within the Pastoral 87.15% of children have
complete vaccinations for their age while I find that 71% of children of teenagers
have not completed the vaccinations within 2 months of the schedule,6 however,
within 1 year and two months of the schedule, 85% of children of teenagers do
complete the regimen. We cannot compare this to the Pastoral, since this statis-
tic is not offered, but the World Health Organization reports that in 2008 vaccine
coverage in the entire country was 96%.
Within the literature on teen mothers, another concern for child develop-
ment is the limited nurturance teens impart to their children (Oyserman, Radin,
and Saltz). This, in turn, hinders the child’s development. Statistically, both
teens and grandmothers agree that the grandmother is a better care-giver and
my own observations also align with this story. For example, I often saw them
lift their children by one arm to transport them small distances, or over low bar-
riers, like a big step or into a playpen. One young mother disturbed me greatly
by bouncing her baby on her lap in the same manner one would shake a rag doll.
The baby didn’t seem to know what to make of it, too agitated to cry. While I as-
sume this young woman was on drugs due to the utter jitteriness of her actions,
the other teens are careless with their children due to haste and immaturity;
with their limited parenting experience, teens can lack a conscientiousness of
how their actions affect their children, hindering development.
517 In the Pastoral 62.2% (region 2) and 53.4% (region 3) of six-month-olds are exclusively
breast fed and 59.3% (region 2) and 87.5% (region 3) of four-month-olds are exclusively breast
fed.
6Many children over four did not have vaccines for tetravirus and rotavirus indicated on the
vaccination card, so I did not include these this in the calculation of the statistic, though they
are in the official time line.
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On a psychological level, I observed teens blaming their children. This sub-
tle point was not included on the survey, as it was something I observed later.
In the eyes of their mothers, it was the child’s fault that they were crying, and
that they were misbehaving, and that they had gotten hurt. Occasionally the
kids would get swatted for such behavior. 7 I asked my therapist about the im-
plications of such treatment. In addition to aggression building - either directed
inward or outward - the blaming cycle continues. The “pass the buck” mental-
ity certainly exists in these families, but grandmothers yell at their daughters to
care for their children and the daughters blame the children for getting them in
trouble. While blaming and lack of nurturance are not exclusive traits of teen
mothers, they are ones that can impede the development of the child and must
be addressed.
The story of the family of my data entry personnel illustrates the complicated
family life of a teen mother, highlighting concerns for the child: When Viviane
first told Josefa she was pregnant, Josefa was upset, but soon she assimilated the
news and wanted to help her daughter have a healthy baby. Jadison, is indeed
a chubby little tyke - I fell in love with his smile and he fell in love with my
Nalgene. Unfortunately Viviane has a nervous personality, having fallen into
illnesses due to hypertension, and is now going through an adolescent crisis,
as Josefa has diagnosed it. In addition to attempting to establish independence
from her parents, she is also wishing she were independent of Jadison. She hits
him, and Josefa becomes furious at Viviane. Due to this mistreatment, Josefa
has insisted they put Jadison in daycare, even though their financial situation is
tight. Josefa would like Viviane to be more conscientious. Yet the responsibility
lies on Viviane to parent her child; Josefa is not yet willing to completely take
7Once, on a house visit, I dropped a baby and the grandmother scolded the baby for crying
instead of me for dropping it!
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over the mothering role, though she participates in the baby’s care and scolds
Viviane to do so better.
The survey has quantitatively confirmed poverty and health risks and qual-
itative research has identified developmental and psychological risks: a case is
made that intervention targeted at these families of teen mothers is important
to minimize these risks and to help these youngsters overcome these disadvan-
tages.
4.2.2 Family Structure
Before any policy is undertaken, however, a better understanding of family in-
teraction is required for best selecting a strategy. My analysis in the empirical
paper focuses on the relationships between teen mothers and their mothers. The
survey confirms that these families have matriarchal tendencies, validating the
main focus of policy on teen mothers and their mothers. While men do play a
role in the family, their transience suggests the most influence on children is in
the maternal realm. See Table 2: Distribution of Husbands in the Household. 8
Survey results indicate that the standard econometric technique for analyz-
ing bargaining power in the household (constructing demand functions for pri-
vate goods) is impossible since their consumption of private goods is very low.
(See Table 3.3) Instead I turn to alternative methodologies of qualitative survey
inquiry and economic games.
I include a section on who makes the decisions in the household. The in-
8The prevalence of single, female-headed households among the poor in northeastern Brazil
is one of the reasons I arrived at this topic of study in the first place. My original interest in the
power dynamics between husbands and wives was undermined by the lack of husbands.
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spiration for these questions comes from a survey from Colombia applied to
evaluate their conditional cash transfer program, Familias en Accion: six ques-
tions the wife in the family who made the decisions within different realms in
the household, and they became the basis for questions within my own survey.
I elaborated on this theme by asking not just who made the decision, but also
who executed the task. For example, I inquire who takes the baby to the health
care clinic, and who decides that the baby needs to go to the clinic. Teen mother
and her mother answer these questions separately, and they are able to respond
with up to two individuals who make the decision or do the task, in order of
importance.
My impression was that these questions were not difficult to understand, as
the responses were often swift and decisive: ”Who decides if you need clothes
or products?” “Me.” ”Anyone else?” “No.” 9 (There was much more certainty
about these than about the amount spent on fruits and vegetables in the past
week.) The data are presented in Table 5: Concordance About Who Makes the
Decision. From this we learn that in many categories, both teen and grand-
mother claim responsibility. The grandmother, however, clearly has control
over her own realm, whereas the teen has to defer to the grandmother if she
wants to go out without the baby or may rely on others to purchase her clothes.
While the teen may be the one executing tasks for the baby, it is not clear who
is the mastermind behind determining that these tasks need to be done. This
conclusion suggests a household model where the grandmother is the overall
decision maker, but in specific realms power struggles continue.
9Unexpectedly, the survey itself had the potential to be empowering, or at least increase
awareness. Certainly it was not the case with all the families, but there were a few who com-
mented that the relationship questions made them think. There were also several entrepreneurs
who were pleased to calculate their profits; we helped them do so on the income portion of the
survey. While household surveys are not intended to be an intervention, they could hold a hint
of “consciousness raising” in the spirit of Paulo Freire.
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To complement the sociological questions, I also include economic games
addressing household behavior. In general, games can be quite convincing as
monetary economic incentives provide a snapshot of economic decisions in ac-
tion, even though they are a simulated reality. The challenge of game design
is to simplify an economic question to its essence in a way that convinces the
outsider that the participants fully understand the activity and value the pay-
off. My games addressed the questions of trust in the family and if there was
negotiation when a decision was made, or if one person dominated the decision
making process.
The two games were a trust game and a bargaining game. In the trust game
the participants are introduced to a “magic” hat. Anything that is put into the
hat doubles in value. The participants then are given five coupons of fifty cents
(R$2.50 in total, approx US$1.75) in play money representing the vouchers. The
teenager is the designated owner of the hat.10 Completing step-by-step compre-
hension questions, mother and daughter are informed that everyone, including
the enumerators, will have an opportunity to place all, some, or none of the
coupons in the hat. The enumerators’ values will be randomly selected also be-
tween 0 and R$2.50. The participants are reminded that anything they do not
place in hat is theirs to keep but does not double, and all that goes into the hat
doubles and goes to the teenage mother. After a first round, the game is re-
peated (all contributions from the first game remain unknown), this time with
the grandmother designated owner of the hat. It is easy to conclude that a fam-
ily has more trust the larger the contributions to the other when the other is the
owner of the hat.
In the bargaining game, the grandmother receives R$3 in vouchers and the
10The order of who goes first is randomized.
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baby book shopping is done with the R$9 the teenager will receive. (Again,
this is randomized; half the time the roles are reversed.) The participants are
introduced to the counting book, a product I developed especially for this ex-
periment. 11 The teenager can purchase the book in the following manner: She
does not know the price of the book at the imaginary store, but she can send a
fictitious messenger with the money to purchase the book. She tells the messen-
ger up to what price he should pay for the product. Anything higher than this
value he should not buy it and she keeps the entire R$9, but at a price equal to
or lower than the amount indicated he buys the book for her and brings back
the change. The price of the book will be drawn randomly, a whole number
on [0,R$9]. However, this messenger forgets the amount the teenage mother
told him and so he asks the grandmother for this same information: up to what
amount should he pay for the book? Once more he forgets and asks both of
them together for an amount. Finally he “arrives” at the store, and with all
these amounts floating in his head, he randomly (again through a drawing) re-
members one of them to compare to the store price and purchases accordingly.
All change returns to the teenage mother. After answering the practice ques-
tions, the participants report their individual valuations at the same time, and
the enumerators leave the room to allow for unobserved discussion of a joint
valuation. Our interpretation of the results is as follows: the joint valuation is
going to represent the bargained result. If the joint valuation is equal to one of
11Not only are children’s books a small market for middle class Brazilians, they are much too
expensive for the impoverished. These products (few and far between) cost at least R$20, more
than the minimum wage for day laborers. Only 10.6% of families in the study had baby books.
The counting book I designed was created in sort of a cottage industry, silk screened and sewn
locally with potential to be much more affordable. Being made of strong cloth also makes it
much more durable for babies than cardboard books on the market, ones I initially proposed.
The book can be washed, an advantage for those with messy children (and who doesn’t have
messy children!). Finally, it is of developmental value since it can be used to teach counting as
well as to familiarize children with books. The delight of the leaders of the Pastoral indicates
the book’s novelty and they all appreciated its educational value (see photos).
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the individual valuations, we expect that that person has all the power, whereas
if we have an intermediate result, we have bargaining.
The enumerators practiced administering the games to their family mem-
bers, to determine that an average person understood how the games worked
before testing them on the population in question. From this pilot I ended up
adapting the magic hat game. A calculation involving the contents of the hat be-
ing multiplied by 1.5 was too challenging for many participants. All the practice
questions to determine if they understood went too slowly because of the math,
the outcomes undermined by probable miscalculations. I changed the multipli-
cation to doubling, and that went much faster. Yet even with this adaptation,
about 15% of people still had trouble. The second game had a greater under-
standing by the participants, perhaps due to its more natural framing; magic
hats are not so common in Brazil.
On the other hand, this high level of lack of miscomprehension brings
up many more questions, related more to vulnerability than family structure.
Clearly, there were some people who just did not get it in spite of being led
through the practice procedure. 12 The quantitative evidence does not tell us
why, but my observations suggest the obvious: some people have more dif-
ficulty grasping new concepts and procedures. I have encountered students
like this, who cannot grasp concepts no matter how much it is explained and
the mechanics of the problems walked through. It is not surprising that some
Brazilians will also have similar challenges. The fact that the challenge seems
so simple is a bigger puzzle. Perhaps they “just don’t get it” because they have
taken drugs. A few great-grandmothers (grandmothers of the teens) were quite
old and not used to doing math. Perhaps others shut off their brain right away
12Script available upon request.
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when they discover math is required - the monetary incentive may not have
been high enough to offset the effort of thinking, though we tried to keep it
simple by spelling out the optimal strategies in examples. This latter hypothe-
sis comes from my enumerators: when playing for real, participants were not
self-disciplined enough to remember the ideal strategy. Whatever the reason,
there are important implications. If indeed the people do not understand the
game because it was out of the ordinary, how will their lives be affected by new
innovations? For me, the experiment has brought up new questions of consid-
erable importance. If people are not taking the effort to do simple calculations,
how can these people understand credit cards or investment plans? They may
not be able to determine if they are getting the full benefit from Bolsa Familia,
which can include a base amount and a variable amount, different for children
and teens; they may never realize there was a data entry error. Some people
do not even know how to sign up for Bolsa Familia, as the enumerators were
frequently asked in the streets if they were with the program.
The results of the trust game suggest that families are fairly cooperative.
In one third of the families, both players put everything into the hat. In no
family did anyone keep all the money for themselves; the contributions were
closer to the maximum amount than to the minimum. In the bargaining game,
while a few families were identified as bargainers, on average there was no
overall tendency within the population to bargain (see Chapter 3 for statistical
analysis). This suggests that whether a transfer was targeted to one member
of the family or the other, the outcome would be the same. Thus, for these
families where teen mothers live with their mothers, the current Bolsa Familia
policy of the transfer going to the female household head rather than a minor
seems adequate. With a high level of financial cooperation between mother and
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daughter, and little evidence of bargaining, there is no reason to suspect that
outcomes would improve based on shifting the recipient of the transfer.
But this does not imply that no policy changes are necessary. The current
ones are certainly not sufficient, as many of these families receive Bolsa Familia
yet are still high risk. The vaccination rates are not significantly higher for chil-
dren whose families are enrolled in Bolsa Familia than for those who are. Like-
wise the school enrollment rates for teen mothers are not significantly higher for
those in Bolsa Familia families than for those not in program families, except,
ironically, for 18 and 19 year olds, who are no longer eligible for the stipend.
These last two statistics suggest that the conditionalities required by Bolsa
Familia are too challenging or are unattractive for teen mothers. While we
would not wish to reward teen pregnancy by giving a higher stipend to teen
mothers, we can change the conditions of the program for these families in par-
ticular. The policy decision here is delicate, as the cycle of poverty must be
addressed, and the children of the teens provided for. Yet there must not be so
much attention and service that other teens desire to become pregnant to receive
these benefits. A paper by Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders suggest that parents of
teen mothers in the USA already understand this concept well: parents give less
support to teen mothers who have a younger sister (2005). Of course employ-
ing this strategy-giving more to teen mothers without a younger sister-would
be hard to justify at a government level, but the insight is valid. We will take
incentives into consideration when analyzing the social service agencies.
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4.2.3 The Social Service Agencies
From my fieldwork experiences I identify three models of social service agencies
that serve teen mothers. The first is the community center, where forming a
support group is a primary element. The second is home visits, where one-
on-one parenting education is emphasized. The final is the conditional cash
transfer model, where monetary stipends are provided in exchange for filling
health and educational requirements. With the exception of the organization
functioning under charity model, none encountered were directed particularly
toward teen mothers. Shifting curricula or conditionalities for this special group
could better meet their needs, alleviating the four risks identified that children
of teen mothers face: poverty, health, developmental, and psychological.
The community center Centro Julieta is part of a larger community organi-
zation, Viva Children, Youth, and Families. This project was started decades
ago by a Belgian ex-nun and now incorporates many services. They have a pre-
school, an after-school program (including a small computer room and sports
classes), and a training program for youth to learn technical skills. (For exam-
ple, the youth undertake construction projects improving community members’
homes.) Finally, in the Centro Julieta young mothers bring their learn to become
better parents in a community setting. Viva Children, Youth, and Families used
to support a health clinic as well, but now their main medical activity is setting
up field trips for dental visits for the after-schoolers.
Much funding comes from the director’s financial campaigns in Belgium,
and as they have received many Belgian volunteers over the years, these indi-
viduals continue giving. Local donations are procured as well, with a wealthy
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ladies group sponsoring the Easter celebration.13 They also receive funding
from the government, as the programs are of the sort that the government sub-
contracts to NGOs. For example, the government program PETI (Program for
the Eradication of Child Labor) ensures children at high risk of child labor have
alternate activities such as the after-school program. The center receives fund-
ing according to the number of PETI children enrolled. They also received
money for their job training, as vocational training for youth is another gov-
ernment project, Jovem Aprendiz. However this funding was suspended as they
were not providing the “proper” safety equipment for the youth under 18. 14
The Centro Julieta is unique to Salvador. Again, an innovation by Francine,
this program aids a group of young mothers (not necessarily teens) of a vul-
nerable economic situation. As part of the organization’s larger complex, the
center’s main room had a large kitchen area and a fenced off play area. Several
cribs and playpens were available for napping children. Another portion of the
building had a wash area next to outdoor clotheslines, and a bathroom with a
tub. Most of the toys were Belgian donations, not typical of what a Brazilian
family would have.
Food was served to improve the women’s and babies’ nutrition, as well to
lighten participants’ food expenditures. The day started with breakfast of bread,
fruit, and coffee. There was a prayer, and the rest of the morning lunch was pre-
pared. There was always rice and beans, some vegetables, occasionally pasta
and either chicken or beef cooked in a pressure cooker, often with the vegeta-
13A similar program has employed 15 telemarketers to make local calls and a motercyclist
then travels to collect the donation. While most of the donations are very small to only be
marginally profitable to the organization, they continue the endeavor.
14Francine was very upset about this, as she considered the equipment absurdly expensive,
nothing that local (informal?) professionals used. Since they would not be able to purchase the
equipment, the youth would not learn and would go back to wasting away their lives!
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bles. A short down-time followed lunch, and then clean-up. An afternoon snack
was served right before it was time to leave and sometimes the women took left-
overs with them for dinner.
All of these chores in theory were shared, but usually Marta did more than
everyone else. She and another had been invited that year to help out as exam-
ple mothers. There were also two permanent staff members, Dona Marinalva
and Ana. Marinalva was a plump, earth mother and Ana was a sweet religious
figure with strong convictions but was not one to philosophize. They are simple
people, Marinalva more jovial than Ana, but the latter just as content. They care
deeply for these women and want them to succeed. Ana and Marinalva kept ev-
erything in order, ensuring that children were not neglected and that everyone
was helping out. But some were less helpful than others.
A core group of around 10 young women (not all teens) with their babies at-
tended daily, with a larger number coming for Wednesday morning information
sessions. Usually Ana preached about STIs, condoms, annual exams, nutrition,
and sometimes there was a craft to learn. I most enjoyed the sessions where
the pregnant mothers would break out and discuss what to expect in pregnancy
and birthing. These could be repetitive and were not in depth, but I suspect that
this is the level where these women were at, and repetition was needed, espe-
cially since not everyone came every time. This execution could be improved
for teens in school by allowing for a half-day of attendance rather than a full
day. The risk is that those in school may choose to drop out and attend the full
day since a half-day is not an option.
Though the Center Julieta seeks to improve child development and psychol-
ogy in social setting, my first day at the center was overwhelming. One baby
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played by the stairs, in danger of toppling down. An older girl combed the hair
of a younger one, who fussed in protest. A child hoisted himself to standing
using the coils on the back of the fridge; it teetered. Fortunately this was a day
that was a bit crazier than usual, and even with the lack of safety standards,
there were fewer rescues on a daily basis. Though the implementation is not
perfect, we can only imagine that the babies would be even less cared for at
home. For example, Rose, now 45, had been a teen mother of twins. She lived
with her husband rather than with her mother. When the children would cry,
so would she. Her mother would come over to help out and find all three of
them crying! Though now many more young women maintain lodging with
their mother, allowing for more support in housekeeping, on its best days the
Centro provides further instruction and parental modeling to teen mothers, as
well as an accepting community.
The government offers a program of this nature, Projovem, but it is for ado-
lescents in general and is not targeted to mothers. Projovem is a restructur-
ing of a previous program, Agente Jovem, which served at-risk 16-24 years of
age. Participants received a monthly stipend ($40) for completing a year of
courses which covered citizenship, sexuality, and sometimes vocational train-
ing. Now Projovem Adolescente serves 15-17 year olds and is not accompa-
nied by a stipend, though Projovem Trabalhador (worker) does, providing vo-
cational training for the unemployed under 29. Bolsa Familia, however, was
also amplified in 2008 to provide a stipend ($15) for up to two 16-17 year olds
per family; before the stipend stopped at age 15. While those who are en-
rolled in Bolsa Familia are able to enroll in ProJovem Adolescente, they do
not have additional conditionalities related to ProJovem that limit the stipend;
to receive Bolsa Familia, however, there is a school attendence requirement.
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(www.mds.gov.br/suas/guia protecao /projovem)
The government provides finances to municipalities to implement ProJovem
if it has a sufficient number (40) of at youth risk. Similar to PETI and Jovem
Aprendiz, the municipality can sub-contract an NGO to provide the services.
During my exploratory fieldwork I visited a group of Agente Jovem. That day
they were playing soccer and later had a discussion. The leader explained they
could not always do as much as the curricula required due to the funds not
arriving; sometimes classes were canceled, and students were not interested in
coming when the snack was so unsatisfactory.
While I have not continued to interact with the ProJovem program, the cir-
ricula does not include a portion directed to teen mothers, though they do dis-
cuss intergenerational tensions. They certainly do not offer day-care to children.
While they would be a supportive community group for adolescents, as is the
Centro Julieta, the logistics seem to discourage teen mothers from participating
in them, and the content is not directed toward their needs. The government
could consider adapting the program for this special group of young people.
The next model of social agency addressing the needs of teen mothers is the
home visit model. The decentralized organization Pastoral da Crianc¸a works to
improve children’s nutrition. While the Pastoral is a Catholic organization, peo-
ple of all faiths use its services, as it is widely recognized. Doctors refer patients
to the Pastoral, and it was nominated for a Nobel Prize. I was introduced to the
Pastoral through one of my enumerators who had participated as a local leader
doing home visits and monthly weighings.
Leaders undergo a multi-week training session to be certified. They learn
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how to weigh the children and go through the handbook that covers parent-
ing, health, and hygiene for children and pregnant women. Once they are in
the program, at monthly community meetings they plan events and discuss
challenges. Everyone is a volunteer, and community and regional leaders are
democratically voted in. The monthly weighings take place at a local church.
Mothers bring their children under age six to be weighed by the Pastoral lead-
ers. They have set up a large scale hanging from the rafters and are trained in
the somewhat complicated procedure of calibrating the scale, ensuring that the
children are not wearing shoes or too much clothes, and adjusting the weight
of the child if they are wearing a diaper. The atmosphere is merry, albeit a bit
chaotic with so many children, and everyone is anticipating a tasty snack. A re-
cent addition to the roles of leaders and assistants in the Pastoral is brincadista,
the game coordinator, who also livens the mood.
Countering health risks, the children who are identified as underweight re-
ceive special treatment. They often are given multimistura, a highly nutritious
supplement prepared by those in the Pastoral consisting of grains, seeds, and
powdered egg shells. While all families receive a monthly visit where the lead-
ers talk with the parents about healthy child development and encourage san-
itary and nutritious practices, the families with underweight children receive
more attention, with longer or more frequent visits.
Even though there are Christmas parties with presents for the children, and
parents are not charged for the multimistura, the Pastoral does not want to be
associated with donations. In my study, they wanted to be sure that all the par-
ticipants understood that the remuneration was not coming from the Pastoral.
The leaders do wish to promote dependency on the Pastoral, for it becomes
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very uncomfortable when mothers come clambering for handouts. 15 The lead-
ers prefer to be an educational organization providing community support. In
some sense they also provide a psychological or religious service, as they give
mothers an opportunity to talk to someone and share burdens. Several lead-
ers expressed that with some families they felt helpless, unable to provide any
sustenance, but sensed that their presence was still a comfort for the mother.
The Pastoral does not target teen mothers in any way, and including a sep-
arate section in the handbook on their special needs would be helpful. As is
the trend in development economics, a multi-dimensional measure of child risk
could be used besides just weight. (Malnourishment has decreased significantly
in Brazil, certainly due to the work of the Pastoral.) With age of the mother be-
ing one factor in this index, the Pastoral could take a little more time with these
families. Of course, leaders are doing their own mental assessment of poverty
and risk when they visit, and they already inquire about breastfeeding and vac-
cinations. Never-the-less, a standardized evaluation could be helpful and aid
the Pastoral in determining what goals to target in the future.
The one-on-one interaction offered by the Pastoral can be advantageous for
teens. Not only does the Pastoral arrive at their homes, eliminating concerns
about transportation and day-care, but the intimate interaction allows for teens
and leaders to know one another better than in a group setting. A leader can
observe and help a teen in her own home, and a teen may feel comfortable ask-
ing a leader questions without a group of outsiders. Especially in the pregnancy
stage, health and hygiene topics are sensitive.
15Also for the project they did not want money used because they did not want the recipients
to use it for drugs. They were eventually comfortable with us providing payment with vouchers
from grocery stores.
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The Pastoral receives the majority of its financial resources for administra-
tion from the Brazilian Government, though company and private donations
also help with funding (Pastoral website). Yet none of the local volunteers re-
ceive any payment. While this system ensures a degree of interest in the en-
deavor, this also limits the continuity of care. Volunteers do not always appear,
or become too busy and must leave the program without replacement. I do not
suggest that the Pastoral pay its volunteers, but the government must take this
limitation into consideration when working in tandem with the program.
Government health clinics have community agents who provide services
similar to those of the Pastoral, though on a broader range of topics; they also
visit the elderly and promote dengue prevention, for example. These workers
are recruited from within the community, and they also pay mothers monthly
visits to address similar topics and weigh babies with scales that aren’t as com-
plicated as those of the Pastoral. One of the leaders of the Pastoral complained
that her status had diminished now that the government was providing these
services (though with unstable budgets, strikes do happen, and community
agents can have caseloads that are too large). Since the government pays for
both the community health worker and the Pastoral, it would be beneficial to
coordinate their activities. Though some overlap is likely, and reinforcement
of health education beneficial, redundancy is not desired. I suggest that the
government, with better possibilities for standardized training and consistent
service, focus on basic needs like vaccination and malnutrition, while the Pas-
toral can move on to a holistic developmental focus, one they already use, but
would further emphasize parenting and child development, as well as involv-
ing the entire family (father, grandparents) in the community activities, not just
the mother. This is just one suggestion for possible coordination strategies.
122
As mentioned earlier, over 60% of the families in my sample receive Bolsa
Familia, which represents the final category of social service models, the con-
ditional cash transfer. These programs seek to alleviate poverty through two
mechanisms. Not only do families receive payments, but they only receive them
when children are vaccinated and attending school. These efforts promise to
improve the lives of the children in the future as well as the present. Requiring
much funding, I have not seen any private organizations undertaking such an
effort in Brazil.
Since so many teen mothers receive Bolsa Familia, this is an ideal program
through which to operate as it already has a wide coverage of teen mothers and
it is well-aligned with the goal of mitigating intergenerational poverty. Families
can receive money for both teens (if they are less than 17) and their babies; the
funds are directed to a family household head, usually the grandmother. As
found in the empirical study, targeting stipends toward the teen rather than
the grandmother would probably not significantly change the outcome for the
baby, and might become an incentive for teen pregnancy. What we may consider
instead, would be to alter conditions for teen mothers and their children. Again
this is a delicate process, since these must not be so difficult that teens do not
comply and the family loses the stipend. Yet these additional requirements may
also be discourage others from becoming pregnant. On the other hand, we saw
that requirements were not being met by all who were in Bolsa Familia families.
Any additional requirement must be attractive or easy for teen mothers so as
not to deny them the needed stipend.
Our other models, home visits and community groups, are inspiration for
possible new conditionalities. Not only are government programs in place that
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can be adapted to serve teen mothers, but the activities can be made attractive to
the teen. Home visits do not require the teen to leave the house while commu-
nity groups provide socialization and support that the teen would enjoy. Both
of these can also reinforce compliance with the other requirements, encourag-
ing teen schooling and helping the family ensure that the baby is vaccinated on
time.
Of most convenience to the teen mother would be appointments with the
community health worker, who would receive special training to work with
teen mothers. The program should be complementary to that of the Pastoral,
rather than redundant. To ensure that the health worker also has incentive
to guarantee the appointment, s/he could receive a bonus when the teen was
served more than the minimal amount. Measures would have be taken to guard
against fraud and to confirm that the teen would receive the stipend should the
community worker be sick or on strike. In addition to improving health and
hygiene practices, the community worker can encourage the family to focus on
the child’s developmental progress and encourage nurturance.
Incorporating the teen into a support group would be more challenging since
funds require a central location, and daycare vouchers may be necessary. School
in the morning and an afternoon program may be too much stress on teens’ busy
nursing schedule. Perhaps teen mothers would only attend once a week and
could bring young children. Interacting with children may help with prepare
other teens to become parents later, and would also remind other young women
what a large task parenting is. As they talk amongst themselves, non-mothers
would realize that participation is a requirement of the stipend only for teen
mothers, de-emphasizing any economic incentive that would arise from being
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a Bolsa Familia recipient when having a child.
For those who manage to participate more often, day care vouchers could be
provided. More frequent attendance would give the teens an opportunity for
vocational preparation that might not be available otherwise. While it would be
ideal to modify ProJovem to develop a module for teen mothers, one concern is
that not all municipalities have ProJovem programs. Perhaps in non-ProJovem
municipalities, alternative programs could be arranged or different NGOs con-
tracted.
The discussion thus far has focused on teens, but not looked at the role of
the grandmother. A simple inclusion in home visits by the community health
worker would also seek to engage the grandmother in the teaching and learn-
ing; a psychological intervention could also attempt to break the blaming cy-
cle. With regard to activities outside the home, if Bolsa Familia does extend a
parenting class requirement to teen mothers, the grandmother would become
involved in helping her daughter attend, as she is the one who receives the
transfer. Having the grandmother support participation in a community pro-
gram is likely to improve harmony in the family. If it were an optional program,
the grandmother may scold the daughter for shirking home duties. Instead,
she will contribute her efforts toward the daughter’s attendance. This align-
ment of incentives gives the child the best chance of having a family with less
conflict, a more skilled mother, who will have help keeping him on the vacci-
nation schedule, and his family will have a little more financial support from
the Bolsa Familia stipend as he grows. Though this adds an additional condi-
tionality to Bolsa Familia for teen mothers, it should be one that is pleasant and
enjoyed (though not too much so that other young girls won’t want to become
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teen mothers), and that supports the other conditions being met.16
4.3 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the importance of qualitative research methods for
economists in two ways. First I discussed the valuable insight they can bring
to the quantitative methods themselves; instruction in qualitative research has
been ignored within economics to its detriment. In the second portion of the
paper I presented a case study illustrating how a qualitative analysis has al-
lowed for a much broader understanding of the risks children face and the fam-
ily structure in which they live. These reflections as well as further ones eval-
uating alternative models of social agencies contribute much insight to policy
suggestions to assist teen mothers who live with their mothers.
Due to the initial quantitative goal of the research, these qualitative anal-
yses are not as detailed nor as thorough as if an anthropologist or sociologist
had done them. With a quantitative goal, there is little time for in-depth, open-
ended interviews and transcriptions that would allow for a meticulous analysis
of the subjects. Yet there is rich knowledge to be gleaned from bountiful experi-
ences had while preparing quantitative instruments and participating with the
institutions that interact with these families.
I surprisingly find myself willing to make more emphatic conclusions about
the qualitative observations than the quantitative results. Even though the
16As culture accepts intergenerational households of single mothers as the norm, mothers
may come to expect their daughters to live with them. If this is the case, as shown in Chapter 1,
the mother may have incentive to damper the daughter’s education in order to protect her own
bargaining power in the household. The educational conditionality for receiving Bolsa Familia
also works against this possibility.
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Table 4.1: Comparative Chart of Social Assistance Models
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statistics have a confidence interval, memories of survey packets limp and
wilted from humidity and a long pauses of “um, I don’t know” before an es-
timation is prodded out by an enumerator, haunt the numbers. Once I tried to
purchase a measuring tool for babies’ height, but the ones sold in medical stores
were not accurate - they did not form a right angle; eventually I designed my
own to be constructed by a local carpenter, but hold less faith in official statis-
tics. My personal experiences in administrating such a project leave me much
more suspect of quantitative data in general.
Economists may have some hesitations about doing qualitative research
without the “proper” training, and of course, it should be undertaken. Yet, until
it is solidly part of the economic curriculum, we can take heart in the words of
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, without letting them become an excuse to be ig-
norant of qualitative procedures: “From one point of view, that of the textbook,
doing ethnography is establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing
texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on. But it is
not these things, techniques, and received procedures that define the enterprise.
What defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is” (1973, pg 6).
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
This appendix revisits the models discussed in the text, and the statistical
tests relating to each game are formally derived. As in the main body of the pa-
per, the capital subscript will indicate from which person the variable arises; the
non-capitalized subscript refers to who owns the endowment in the bargaining
game. I assume that utility associated with preexisting levels of consumption
does not enter into the decision making process; this gives the families a max-
imum possible income of R$9 in the bargaining game. Let UG and UT be the
utility functions of the grandmother and teenager respectively, taking on the
normal characteristics of a utility function. xG and xT are private goods and z is
a public good as represented by the baby book.
In the unitary model, one person makes all the decisions or there is a shared
utility function. U f amily = UG(xG, xT , z) if the grandmother is the dictator. In the
bargaining game she chooses v∗G, the monetary valuation she places on the book,
such that the utilities are equal whether or not the baby book is is purchased at
price v∗G.
maxxG ,xT U(xG, xT , 1) = maxxG ,xT U(xG, xT , 0)
s.t. xG, xT ≤ 9 − v∗G s.t. xG, xT ≤ 9
This v∗G is her willingness to pay, an approximation of the utility of the counting
book. this valuation is accurate because the price is chosen at random. Faced
with chance, the participant has no incentive to name a higher valuation than
v∗ and risk paying more than she would like for the good, losing out on some
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additional utility from private consumption goods that the extra money could
buy. Nor will the dictator choose a price lower than her true willingness to pay
since she finds the value of the good higher than the additional marginal utility
achieved from the private expenditures and would actually prefer to own the
good. Thus the valuation she selects reveals her willingness to pay, approximat-
ing her utility of the good in dollars.
The non-dictator valuation is meaningless in real life, as the dictator’s de-
cisions will override the other’s, providing a null hypothesis for the dictator-
unitary model at the population level: the joint valuation is equal to the grand-
mother’s or teen’s individual valuation. A difference in these allow us to reject
this hypothesis; we are unable to do that with this data.
Though the non-dictator usually takes a back-seat, in this game, since the
non-dictator’s valuation may still be chosen, this individual may engage in
some strategy. Suppose the non-dictator is self-interested, as in Becker’s rot-
ten kid theorem, not caring for her mother’s consumption. Then she will find a
v∗T that solves
U(x∗T (9 − v∗T ), 1) = U(x∗T (9), 0)
where x∗T is the solution to the dictator’s maximization problem. Thus the non-
dictator’s valuation is not likely to represent her actual utility from the baby
book, unlike the dictator’s valuation; her valuation will be skewed by the trans-
formative function x∗T . In this model, any comparisons made between the val-
uations do not necessarily represent a comparison in utility, though they do
provide insight to behavior.
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As long as x∗T is a normal good, the non-dictator wishes to maximize house-
hold income. The dictator will wish to do so, as well, indicating that Pareto
optimality is a characteristic of this family. To test Pareto Optimality at the pop-
ulation level, a one sided t-test is applied to the sum of the contributions by
teenager and grandma in the trust game.
Ho : CT + CG = 5
Ha : CT + CG < 5
The data from the trust game reject the Pareto optimality hypothesis for the
population as a whole, as well as for the subset of the population of families
who understood. This implies that the unitary model cannot hold as a model at
the population level since efficiency is violated.
Though rejecting the unitary model for the population due to the Pareto ef-
ficiency violation, the discussion would not be complete without considering
a unitary model of consensus. This model suggests that all family members
have the same utility function and thus all will arrive at the same valuation. At
the population level an F test can consider if all the valuations may follow the
same distribution, or if they should be divided into three different categories
and be considered separately. With V a valuation and T a dummy if the valua-
tion is the teen’s and G a dummy indicating the valuation is the grandmother’s,
V = T + G +  should have the coefficients on both T and G be zero if the con-
sensus model holds. The complication is that we must take into consideration
any confounding effects of changing the order of valuations, an experimental
variation. Additionally, there should be no effect from changes in ownership
endowment, a feature of bargaining. We find that this is the case, but first we
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discuss this test of bargaining, and afterward we shall return to complicate the
statistical test with all its components.
Cooperative Bargaining, or the collective model, is Pareto efficient by def-
inition, so for this model to hold at the population level, the Pareto efficiency
hypothesis must hold, which we already rejected. However, the analysis of the
bargaining game is interesting and may be analyzed at the family level, so let
us continue. In a stylized example without altruism, the family maximizes
θUT (xT , z) + (1 − θ)UG(xG, z)
s.t. xT + xG + z ≤ y
where θ is the sharing rule: any income (y) left over after expenditures on z
are divided according to this rule. When the teenager is asked privately for her
valuation of the counting book, she chooses her valuation vT such that
UT (θ(9 − vT ), 1) = UT (θ9, 0)
If utility is money metric in xT , let UBBT be the utility of the baby book for
the teenager.
θ(9 − vT ) + UBBT = θ9
UBBT
θ
= vT
Since θ < 1, the valuation chosen by the teenager is an overstatement of her
utility. If the power coefficient θ is derived from income, then when the recip-
ient of the endowment changes, there should be a different θ, say θg when the
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grandmother is owner and θt when the teen is owner. The magnitude of the
change does not have to be very large to be detectable in this experiment. Sup-
pose a teenager’s utility of the baby book to be R$2. If the power in the family
is divided evenly when she receives the endowment, then her valuation shall
be 4. Even a mere 15% decrease in the sharing rule when her mother owns the
endowment could be perceivable, with the teenager’s valuation increasing to 5.
This sensitivity is cardinal, however, with changes more perceptible at extreme
values of theta. For example, from a change in θ from .89 to .85, the individual
with more power and a utility equal to 1 is unlikely to change her valuation
from 1, as the exact valuations are 1.12 and 1.18, but the other individual will
certainly change her valuation as with a base utility of 1, her valuation goes
from 9.09 to 6.66.
This variation of ownership endowment in the experiment does not happen
in each family, however, so its effect is only testable on the population level.
This implies the simple test of the bargaining model: vgT , vtT or vgG , vtG. If
either holds, bargaining is confirmed. Yet we have already determined that on
average, families are not Pareto Optimal, ruling out the possibility of a coop-
erative model. Might this same test be useful for confirming non-cooperative
bargaining as well?
Suppose that in a non-cooperative model a sharing rule still exists for di-
viding income, but the expenditures on public goods are decided individually,
rather than jointly. Thus the model follows the structure of a Cournot equilib-
rium, where each individual separately decides how much to invest in a public
good, arriving at a non-efficient result. The teenager, for example, faces this
maximization problem:
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maxxT ,zT UT (xT , zT + zG)
s.t. xT + zT < θy
The grandmother solves her corresponding problem. Note that the when
the sharing rule is 0 or 1, the person with all the income will not purchase the
private good for the other. This may be why in the trust game, a small amount
is reserved for individual purchases if it can be hidden. Taking this supposition
even further, if there were no public good, then nothing would be contributed
in the trust game if hiding is feasible. This was not an outcome, however, so it
is unlikely that pure individualism reigns in these families.
When asking for individual valuations of the baby book instead of contribu-
tions for a joint purchase, the bargaining game asks a different question than in
many public goods scenarios. Yet this focus allows the analysis to be the same
as in the cooperative bargaining game, with vT = UBBTθ . Thus the same statisti-
cal test of a change in valuations with a change in endowment can be used. In
the non-cooperative game the joint valuation may have a different relationship
to the other two valuations, however, than in the cooperative model. Suppose
the decision about v∗J is made using the budget constraint since there is no joint
utility function by which to maximize.
θ(y − v∗J) + UBBT + (1 − θ)(y − v∗J) + UBBG = y
Substituting in UBBT and UBBG, we have v∗J = θvT +(1−θ)vG, a linear combination
of the individual contributions. All else constant, the joint valuation arrived at
in the non-cooperative family will be greater than that in the cooperative family,
due to the inefficiencies.
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We have thus completed the necessary discussion to return to our test of the
models in the book game. We have two variations in the experiment (the en-
dowment ownership and order of the valuations) and within the experiment
three valuations. If we find a significant difference between individual valua-
tions under different endowments, we have confirmed bargaining. Otherwise
the unitary model cannot be rejected. We are also concerned that valuations may
shift under the order of the valuations: perhaps with more or less time people
desire the book differently. Finally, though we may not find the source of vari-
ation in the experiments to cause differences, there may be inherent differences
in how teenagers and their mothers value the book; a significant difference in
valuations disprove a consensus model as we discussed earlier. Likewise, if
the joint valuation is not significantly different from one of their valuations but
significantly different from the other, a dictator model is implied.
We can simultaneously test all these individual variation effects as well as
interaction effects within one regression model. Let TV, GV, and JV be dummy
variables representing that the valuation belongs to teenager, grandmother, or
is the joint valuation. Let J1 and J2 be dummies indicating if the joint valua-
tion was given first or second. Let TE and GE be dummies indicating if the
endowment was given to the teenager or the grandmother. Choosing a base
comparison case, such as JV J1 TE, regressing the other variables and their inter-
actions indicate if there are significant differences in V, the monetary valuations,
from this base case.
V = β1TV + β2GV + β3J2 + β4GE + β5TV J2 + β6TVGE + β7GV J2 + β8GVGE +
β9TV J2GE + β10GV J2GE + 
More permutations determine significant differences from other cases. Not
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finding significance of any single variable, nor joint significance, we are able to
pool the variables and look at just one experimental variation at a time. These
statistics, reported in Table 3.11 likewise do not indicate any effect. The unitary
model, in this case of bargaining over a baby book, has not been refuted at the
population level. Before we discussed the results of the trust game, in which
we rejected the Pareto optimal hypothesis. This finding is not supported by the
unitary model, leaving us with an unexpected contradiction.
Since valuations are a function of the sharing rule θ and individual prefer-
ences, we can hypothesize that family and individual characteristics may af-
fect this and in turn the valuations. When I include these in the model, I find
no significance. (This iteration is not reported.) However, when we include
a dummy variable representing Pareto optimality and another for “not under-
standing the trust game” in the equations, the coefficient on Pareto optimality
is large and significant; in efficient families, all valuations are lower (see Table
3.11). This exploration is not based on a specific functional form from the theory,
but never-the-less is justified since both games test a different aspect of the same
model: we suspect that the behavior exhibited in one game is related to the be-
havior in another game. Continuing further, I divide the sample into the groups
efficient, non-efficient, and not-understanding and run the original regression
to determine if one of these sub-groups may exhibit bargaining behavior. We
find significant differences in valuations in the book game only for non-efficient
families (see Table 3.12).
This concludes the explanation of formal links between the statistical tests
used in the paper and the analytical models of household. Statistics and analysis
are found in the “Results” section.
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